Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law

LARC @ Cardozo Law
Articles

Faculty

2003

Hegel’s Theory of Measure
David Gray Carlson
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, dcarlson@yu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David G. Carlson, Hegel’s Theory of Measure, 25 Cardozo Law Review 129 (2003).
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/42

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information,
please contact christine.george@yu.edu, ingrid.mattson@yu.edu.

HEGEL'S THEORY OF MEASURE
David Gray Carlson*

INTRODUCTION
I. SPECIFIC QUANTITY

130
138

A. The Specific Quantum
B. Specifying Measure
1. The Rule 144
2. Specifying Measure
a. Remark 149
3. Relation of the two Sides as Qualities
a. Remark 152
C. Being-For-Self in Measure

II. REAL MEASURE

138
143
146
150
155

158

A. The Relation of Self-Subsistent Measures
161
1. Combination of Two Measures
161
2. Measure as a Series of Measure Relations
167
3. Elective Affinity
172
a. Remark: Berthollet on Chemical Affinity and Berzelius's
Theory of it
174
B. Nodal Line of Measure-Relations
177
1. Remark:
Examples of Such Nodal Lines; the Maxim,
'Nature Does not Make Leaps'
181
C. The Measureless
183

III. THE BECOMING OF ESSENCE

188

A. Absolute Indifference
B. Indifference as Inverse Ratio of Its Factors
1. Remark: Centripetal and Centrifugal Force
C. Transition into Essence

CONCLUSION
APPENDIX

189
191
196

200
203
205

* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to thank Cinzia
Ferrini, Jon Heiner, Alan Paterson and Alan Wolf for the comments and help in preparing this
article, and the seminars on the Science of Logic held at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and
the George Washington University School of Law.

129

130

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1

That is "measured" in which [quality and quantity] are so unified
that neither can be altered without altering the other.'

INTRODUCTION

This article explores the theory of Measure^ that is set forth in the
seventh through ninth ehapters of Hegel's monumental Science of
Logic.^ Measure is the third final province in the kingdom of Quality,
whieh itself comprises the first kingdom in the tripartite empire of the
Science of Logic. When Measure concludes, we will have arrived at the
portal of the negative, correlative underworld of shadowy Essence.
Hegel proclaims the development of Measure to be "extremely
difficult." (331)"^ Many commentators have concurred.^ We can
' G.R.G. MURE, THE PHN:.osoPHY OF HEGEL 116 (1965).
2 Capitalization loosely signifies that the term in question has an official place in Hegel's
Logic. Pictographic diagrams for every step of the Logic (through the end of Measure) can be
found in the appendix. The beginning of the appendix describes how these diagrams are to be
read.
3 All numbers in parentheses refer to page numbers fi-om GEORG W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S
SCIENCE OF LOGIC (A.V. Miller trans. 1969). Volume number and page numbers in brackets
refer to G.W.F. HEGEL, WISSENSCHAFT DER LOGIK (1975). I have also omitted ellipses at the
end of any quoted phrase. An ellipsis signals that a sentence does not end with the quoted words.
Hegel's sentences, however, never end, and so ellipses convey no useful information.
^ "[E]ine der schwierigsten Materien." [1: 340]. This has been found "a particularly
significant observation, since such modesty is not often encountered in his writings." Louik
Fleischhacker, Hege! on Mathematics and Experimental Science, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM
209, 211 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993).Cinzia Ferrini finds in this remark, added to the 1831
version of the Science of Logic, a complex story involving Hegel's renunciation of his notorious
early dissertation, De Orbitis Planetarum, where he deduced from Logic the ratio of the distances
between planets. Ferrini notes that Hegel simply renounced this conclusion in the 1817
"Heidelberg" Encyclopedia, and then omitted the renunciation in the later Berlin editions. The
Heidelberg version was based on a "single" transition from Quality to Quantity, and a "single"
transition back. In this' single transition, only vanishing was emphasized. Hence, Hegel could
flatly renounce De Orbitis. But in the 1827 and 1830 Berlin editions of the Encycolpedia, Hegel
realized that there was a "double" transition, which 1 have described elsewhere. David Gray
Carlson, Hegel's neory of Quantity, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2027, 2147-48 (2002) [hereinafter
Carlson, Quantity^ In the double transition, each side of the syllogism vanishes and sustains
itself. This leads Hegel to withdraw his renunciation of his earlier work, since empirical quanta
are not entirely unrelated to Logic. Cinzia Ferrini, Framing Hypotheses: Numbers in Nature and
the Logic of Measure in the Development of Hegel's System, in HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF
NATURE 283 (Stephen Houlgate ed., 1998) [hereinafter Ferrini, Framing]-, Cinzia Ferrini, Logica
efilosofia della natura nella dottrina dell'essere hegeliana (I) 1991 RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA
FILOSOFIA 701; Cinzia Ferrini, Logica e fdosofia della natura nella dottrina dell'essere
hegeliana (II) 1992 RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA ILOSOFIA 103. On Hegel's notorious dissertation,
see Olivier Depre. The Ontological Foundations of Hegel's Dissertation oflSOI, in id. at 257.
5 Errol Harris judges Measure to be "extraordinarily difficult... so obscure as to be, for the
most part, hardly intelligible, and, while it contains some astonishingly prescient scientific
comments, it also indulges in what, to us in the twentieth century, must appear ill-informed and
perverse polemic against sound scientific insights." ERROL E. HARRIS, AN INTERPRETATION OF
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nevertheless describe the theme of Measure easily enough—change;
more precisely, an exploration of the difference between qualitative and
quantitative change.
Change has itself changed over our logical joumey. At first,
change was transition. Being became Nothing. Determinate Being
became Negation. The Finite ceased to be. Starting with the True
Infinite, however, change itself changed. The True Infinite did not
cease to be. It stayed what it was even while it became something
different. This was the beginning of ideality. In True Infinity,
immediate Being ceased to be and preserved itself in an idealized form.
When Being ceased to be (while surviving as the mere memory of
immediacy), we entered the realm of Quantity, which was Being with
all its content outside of itself. Whatever Quantity is, it is by virtue of
outside force designating what it is. Quantity is open to mere
quantitative change. Quantitative change is change imposed from the
outside. The very quality of Quantum was that it was open (and
therefore) indifferent to change imposed upon it from the outside.
Qualitative change is self-imposed change from the inside. We
will learn, however, that genuine qualitative change depends on
quantitative change. Nature does make great leaps, but only after nature
indifferently undergoes incremental quantitative change.^ Liquid water,
as it gets colder due to outside force, indifferently stays liquid, but, at 0°
centigrade, liquid, radically and all at once, becomes a solid.
Measure emerged in the Ratio of Powers {e.g.,
= y), which
showed itself to be "self-related externality." (327)'' In
= y, the
identity of the first (internal) x is determined by the second (external) x.
Hence, the first x is in the thrall of externality. Nevertheless, x = x, and
so it is self-related, even while externally determined. As self-related,
the Ratio of Powers (which we may now call Measure) is "a sublated
externality." (327)^ Under the law of sublation,^ externality is canceled
and preserved. Hence, Measure "has within itself the difference from
itself." (327)'o
When difference was simply external, we had before us
quantitative difference. But now, having been captured by Measure,
this difference is a qualitative moment. The quantitative report of a

THE LOGIC OF HEGEL 143 (1983).
^ For this reason, "a seemingly innocent change of quantity acts as a kind of snare, to catch
hold of the quality ... "GEORG W.F. KEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC § 108 Remark (William Wallace
trans., 1975) [hereinafter LESSER LOGIC].
7 "[Sjelbst beziehende AuBerlichkeit." [1:336]. See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at
2145-48. By "ratio" Hegel means any relation between two quanta, including Aiy, x', orx/y.
8 "[AJufgehobene Ax&er\ictilse\i." [1: 336].
9 On sublation, see David Gray Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Quality, 22 CARDOZO L. REV.
425, 452 (2001) [hereinafter Carlson, Quality],
'9 "[H]at an ihr selbst den Untershied von sich." [1: 336].
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Measure is the thing's own authentic report of itself." When the mode
is external but essential, Measure is before us. As John Burbidge
remarks:
Measuring. . . introduces an explicit act of relating. It brings
together two realities, indifferent to each other. This conjunction is
recognized as valid, however, only if each term allows for, and
indeed encourages, the assoeiation. Since mutual reference is now an
inherent characteristic of the concept, one passes beyond simple
immediacy.'^

Essence. Measures are brought together by an external measurer.
Nevertheless, the Measures are ready to be brought together. Measure
therefore is, as Hegel will later say, "the immanent quantitative
relationship of two qualities to each other." (340)" Each Measure,
however, imposes quantitative change on the other Measure. Each
Measure has a qualitative resilience against the change imposed upon it
from the outside. If this resilience is isolated and considered on its own,
we have the Measureless—or Essence. Hegel now provides his first
definition of Essence—"to be self-identical in the immediacy of its
determined being." (329)"' In the realm of Essence, things mediate
themselves. They are not mediated by outside forces. Self-mediation is
called "reflection." (330)
Though beyond Measure, Essence is nevertheless "already
immanent in measure." (329)" But self-mediation (reflection) is still
only implicit." The Determinations of Reflection are destined to enjoy
a self-subsistence and independence from the qualitative and the
quantitative.

• 1 As one commentator puts it:
In the Hegelian system, the quantities involved in measurement, which from an
epistemological point of view are a means to cognition, are ontologized and treated as
natural objects, that is to say as the objects of an overriding analytical cognition. What
is more, the equalities in behaviour constituting the substance or content of the
quantities meastu-ed are interpreted as being things. As a result, the natural world as
determined by Hegel corresponds to the view of nature developed by mechanicism, the
world-view of the mechanistically-minded popularizers of natural science.
Renate Wahsner, The Philosophical Background to Hcgcl's Criticism of Newton, in HEGEL AND
NEWTONTANISM, supra note 4, at 81, 83.
12 JOHN W. BURBIDGE, ON HEGEL'S LOGIC: FRAGMENTS OF A COMMENTARY 63 (I98I). In
his later book on chemistry, however, Burbidge less plausibly remarks: "Measuring uses a
quantity to specify a quality. That definition sets the logical task." JOHN W. BURBIDGE, REAL

PROCESS: HOW LOGIC AND CHEMISTRY COMBINE IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 53
(1996). This formulation threatens to obscure the fact that, for Hegel, a Measure's quality is its
quantity—accurate reportage of what the thing is.
13 "Das Mafi ist so das immanente quantitative verhalten zweier Qualitaten zueinander."
[1:350].
I'l "[I]n der Unmittelbarkeit des bestimmtseins identisch." [1:339].
15 "Es liegt in dem MaBe bereits." [1:339].
16 "Determinations of Reflection" (Reflexionbestimung) is the subject of the eleventh chapter
in the SCIENCE OF LOGIC.
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For the moment, Quality and Quantity are still with us, but in
mediated form. Each of these extremes in the syllogism of Measure is
equally the one and the other. This was not so before. In Quality, the
Understanding (i.e. the prepositional logic of what is) grasped Being as
an affirmative immediacy. In Quantity, the Understanding learned that
the negative, quantitative moment of Continuity was the truth of Being.
Now the Understanding sees that the qualitative and the quantitative are
two houses both alike in dignity. The difference between them is
"indifference and so is no difference." (330)'^ The difference between
Quality and Quantity has been sublated. In Ratio, Quantity showed
itself to be a retum-into-self to extemal, merely quantitative change.
This very reflection-into-self is Quality. It is not mere Being-for-self
(which self-destructed and became nothing). Rather, this form of
Being—^reflection-into-self—is "being-in-and-for-self—the attribute of
Essence. (330)'^ Thus, Hegel introduces in Measure the portentous new
brand of substance—^being-in-and-for-self.
Being-in-and-for-self, however, is merely implicit in Measure.
"Measure, still as such is itself the immediate [seiende] unity of quality
and quantity; its moments are determinately present as a quality, and
quanta thereof." (330)'^ Immediate Measure is actually a mediation of
qualitative and quantitative moments. Measure will be revealed as
always a ratio of Measures. Within the ratio, each side will further
reveal itself to be a "ratio of specific quanta having the form of selfsubsistent measures from each other" (330)^0 yielding an infinite
regression or "bad infinity." The sides of every ratio have mere
quantitative difference. This implies that each measure continues into
the other, and therefore beyond itself entirely. The name of this passage
into the beyond is the Measureless.
The Measureless is the negativity of Measure, but only in
principle. The indifference of the determinations of Measure to their
negative "Measureless" soul must be demonstrated. This is the final
result of Real Measure.^* Real Measure is "real through the negativity
contained in the indifference." (330)^^ It is "an inverse ratio of
measures." (330)^^ In this Ratio, which must remain largely mysterious
"[D]er Unterschied ist als gleichgultig." [1:339].
"[D]as An- undFiirsichsein." [I: 339].
1' "Das MaC noch als solches ist selbst die seiende Einheit des Quaiitativen und
Quantitativen; seine Momente sind ais ein Dasein, eine Quaiitat und Quanta derseiben." [1:339].
20 "Verhaitnis von spezifischen Quantis ais seibstandigen iVlaBen." [i:340].
21 "Real," for Hegei, tends to be a diaiecticai word, denoting a determinateness. See JOHN W.

BURBIDGE, HEGEL ON LOGIC AND RELIGION: THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 44
(1992) RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD, AUTONOMY AND NORMATTVITY 50 (2001) ("reality is the
determinacy something in virtue of its contrast to something else"). Here, Real Measure is the
second, "dialectical" chapter of Measure.
22 "[R]eell mit der in ihr enthaltenen Negativitat." [1:340].
23 "[U]mgekehrtes Verhaitnis von MaBen." [1:340].
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until the third chapter of Measure,the extremes of the syllogism show
themselves to be self-subsistent—indifferent to their negative soul.
Because they are so, the Measures are only quantitatively related and
qualitatively distinct. They can dispense with their negative unity
entirely. That is, the Qualitative Measures retreat within themselves
and shed their true content—Essence, "which is their reflection-intoself." (331)25 At this point, externality has sublated itself, and Being's
journey draws to a close.
Measure and the social sciences. Because Measure entails
external imposition upon a phenomenon that is partly free and
independent of outside oppression, Hegel is able to set forth a kind of
hierarchy in the natural sciences in terms of conduciveness to Measure.
"The complete, abstract indifference of developed measure ... can only
be manifested in the sphere of mechanics'''' wherein matter is abstract.
(331)26 In the inorganic and even more in the organic spheres. Measure
is "subordinated to higher relationships." (332)22 The free development
of Measure according to logic is still less to be found in politics or
constitutional law—"the realm of spirit." (332)28
^^^y be that the
Athenian constitution is suited only to city-states, "but all this yields
neither laws of measure nor characteristic forms of it." (332)2^ In this
sphere "there occur differences of intensity of character, strength of
imagination, sensations, general ideas, and so on." (331)5o The
"measure" of such phenomena never goes "beyond the indefmiteness of
strength or weakness.'''' (332)5^ Ordinal, not cardinal, measures are the
most political science can expect to achieve.
Hegel terminates his introduction to Measure with a blast at
empirical psychology—of late quite the fashion in American law
reviews:52 "[h]ow insipid and completely empty the so-called laws turn
24 See infra text accompanying notes 317-405.
25 "[wjelche ihre Reflexion-in-sich ... ist." [1:340].
26 "Die vollstandige, abstrakte Gleichgiiltigkeit des entwickelten Mafles ... kann nur in der
Sphare des Mechanismus statthaben." [1:341].
27 "[H]6hem Verhaltnissen untergeordnet." [1:341]. Professor Ferrini suggests that these
observations were designed to answer Goethe, who questioned the propriety of measiuang organic
processes. She reads Hegel as not entirely rejecting measures of organic life, in the nature of
Goethe, but conceding the limitations of doing so. Cinzia Ferrini, On the Relation Between
"Mode" and "Measure" in Hegel's Science of Logic: Some Introductory Remarks, 20 OWL OF
MINERVA 20, 47-48 (1988) [hereinafter Ferrini, Mode and Measure],
28 "[I]m Reich des Geistes." [1:342].
29 "[A]ber dies gibt weder Gesetze von Mafien noch eigentiimliche Formen desselben."
[1:342].
50 "Im Geistigen als solchem kommen Unterschiede von Intensitaat des Charakters, Starke
der Einbildungskraft, der Empfmdtmgen, der Vorstellungen usf." [1:342].
51 "[A]ber fiber dis Unbestimmte der Starke oder Schwache geht die Bestimmung nicht
hinaus." [1:342].
52 For a critical view of this fashion, see Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too
Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 1907 (2002).
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out to be which have been laid down about the relation of strength and
weakness of sensations, general ideas and so on, comes home to one on
reading the psychologies which occupy themselves with such laws."
(332)33
Hegel, I think, objects to empirical psychology because it proposes
to reduce human freedom to a set of inviolable laws. Any such attempt
to measure freedom
is what Hegel attacks elsewhere as mere
phrenology.3'*
Modality. Before proceeding on to Specific Quantity—Hegel's
first chapter on Measure—1 would like to backtrack and discuss Hegel's
treatment, early in his introductory essay, of a topic seemingly unrelated
to physical measurement—Kant's notion of modality. At the beginning
of the Science of Logic, Hegel writes:
Measure can also, if one wishes, be regarded as a modality; but since
with Kant modality is supposed no longer to constitute a
determination of the content, but to concem only the relation of the
content to thought, to the element, it is a quite heterogeneous
relation.... (80)33
This passage in effect accuses Kant of believing that thought has
no effect on the object measured.36 Hegel now elaborates on this
criticism.3'7 Modality—^where thought meets object—is the "sphere of

33 "Wie matt und vollig leer die sogenannten Gesetze ausfallen,die fiber das Verhaltnis von
Starke imd Schwache der Empfindimgen, Vostellungen usf. auggestellt werden, wird man inne,
weim man die Psychologien nachsieht, welche sich mit dergleichen bemilhen." [1:342],
Kant joins in the condemnation:
If we took principles from psychology, i.e. from observations about ottr understanding .
. . this would therefore lead to the cognition of merely contingent laws. In logic,
however, the question is not one of contingent but of necessary laws.
IMMANUEL KANT, LOGIC 16 (Robert S. Hartman & Wolfgang Schwarz trans., 1974).
34 GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT TI309 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977)
[hereinafter PHENOMENOLOGY]. On social science's hatred of freedom, see Jeatme L. Schroeder,
The Stumbling Block: Freedom, Rationality and Legal Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.

263 (2002).
35 "Das Mafi kann auch fur eine Modalitat, wenn man will, angesehen werden; aber indem bei
Kant diese nicht mehr eine Bestimmung des Inhalt ausmachen, sondem nur die Beziehtmg
desselben auf das Denken, auf das Subjektive, angehen soil, so ist dies eine ganz heterogene ...
Beziehtmg." [1:65].
36 See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 142 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., 1990)
(the categories of modality do not determine the object, but only express its relation to the faculty
of cognition).
37 It has been suggested that Hegel's identification of modality as a form of measure
constitutes "the essence of Hegel's response to the challenge of the way in which transcendental
idealism treated determinate being." Ferrini, Mode and Measure, supra note 27, at 40. Professor
Ferrini notes that most commentators view the discussion of modality to be a digression that has
nothing to do with Measure, a position she criticizes. E.g., HARRIS, supra note 5, at 144. Harris,
however, vindicates himself by pointing out that Hegel's remarks here "serve to show that
Measure in the Doetrine of Being is really an inchoate disclosure of the relation between
imiversal and particular," id., a relation Hegel will address directly in the Subjective Logic many
chapters hence.
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coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be." (329)^^ By this, Hegel means to
comment on Kant's notion that the gap between subject and object is
unbridgeable. Hence, subjectivity "ceases to be" in the thing-in-itself.
And the thing-in-itself "ceases to be" in subjective experience. In
Hegel's opinion, objects "come to be" in the measure of thought.^^
Kantian modality is faulted for not being Measure to the extent thought
leaves the object unaffected.'^"
For Kant, modality, fourth in his famous table of categories,'^' is
the choice of possibility or impossibility, existence or non-existence,
necessity or contingency. In his table, Kant leads with "quantity" and
"quality"—a priority Hegel reverses.''^ For Kant, quantity comes first.
Within quantity, "unity" stands over against "plurality." The unity of
unity and plurality is "totality." Quality is second. Within Quality,
Kant opposes reality to negation; their unity is limitation. The triplicity
that Hegel so much favored is confined within a given category. But no
triplicity inheres between quantity, quality, relation and modality. For
this very reason, Hegel writes, Kant "was unable to hit on the third to
quality and quantity." (327)"^
Hegel implies that "modality" was Kant's true third. If so, then we
can see why Hegel equates modality with Measure. "Relation"—Kant's
nominal third—is dismissed as merely an "insertion." (327)'''' Kantian
38
39
'•0
41

"[D]ie Sphare des Entstehens und Vergehens." [1:338],
See Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 522.
Ferrini, Mode and Measure, supra note 27, at 43.
Kant's categories are as follows:
I.
II.
Of Quantity
Of Quality
Unity
Reality
Plurality
Negation
Totality
Limitation
III
Of Relation
Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et aceidens)
Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)
Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient)
IV
Of Modality
Possibility.—Impossibility.
Existence.—^Non-existence.
Necessity.—Contingenee.
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 36, at 62.
42 Earlier, we saw Hegel advertising the wisdom of beginning with Quality and deriving
Quantity therefrom. See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 44, at 2030-31; see also Science of Logic,
supra note 3, at 79 ("hitherto the determination of quantity has been made to precede quality and
this ... for no given reason"); ("der Quantitdt vor der Qualitdt aufgefurt wird ... ohne weitem
Grund")[I:64].
43 "[D]aher hat er nicht auf das Dritte der Qualitat und Quantitat kommen kdnnen." [1:337].
44 "Einshiebung." [1:336]. Gadamer suggests that Relation in Kant corresponds to Essence in
Hegel's Logic. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, HEGEL'S DIALECTIC: FIVE HERMENEUTICAL STUDIES
81 (Christopher Smith trans., 1976).
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modality, Hegel says, is "the relation of the object to thought."
Kant perceived thought as entirely external to the thing-in-itself. The
first three categories belong to thought alone—though to the objective
quality of thought. Modality involves the relation of thought to object.
It contains the determination of reflection-into-self, meaning that, by
encountering objects, modality renders the objects into thoughts and
brings them under the jurisdiction of the mind. This signifies that the
objectivity common to the other categories is lacking in modality. The
modalities—^possibility, existence and necessity—do not add to the
determination of the object. They only express the relation of the object
to the faculty of cognition. In short, for Kant, thought leaves the object
unaffected.
For Spinoza, "mode" was third after substance and attribute. Mode
was the "affections"—i.e., affectations—of substance: "that element
which is in an other through which it is comprehended." (327)"^^
Accordingly, mode for Spinoza is "externality as such." (327)'^^
Because "mode" is external, it is the untrue. Mode, then, is "the nonsubstantial generally, which can only be grasped through an other."
(328)"^® Modal being for Spinoza is precisely what does not endure.
When the modal thought of substance disappears (back into substance),
nothing of mode remains. As Hyppolite puts it, Spinoza "failed to see
that if every determination is a negation, that negation is genuinely
expressed (fbr-itself and no longer only in-itself) only in the mode .. .
"49

The Hindus had a similar triune organization, leading to
comparisons with Christianity, but, Hegel insists, the comparison is
misleading. In Hindu religion, the unity of Brahma disperses but does
not return. The supreme goal is "submergence in unconsciousness,
unity with Brahma, annihilation." (329)^" But in Christianity, "there is
"[D]ie Beziehwig des Geyenstand auf das Denken." [1:336]. See Ferrini, Mode and
Measure, supra note 27, at 36 ("[F]or Kant, modality was concerned solely with the meaning of
the verb "to be," as is used in order to indicate or establish a connection between an object and a
proposition, and this use had to be based upon the faculty of cognition in that the modality is
understood as de re and not de dicto").
46 "[D]ie Affektionen der Substanz oder fur dasjenige, was in einem Andem ist, durch
welches es auch begriffen wird." [1:227].
47 "[D]ie AuPerlichkeit als solche." [1:327].
48 "[D]as Nichtsubstantielle uberhaupt, das nur aus einem Andem gefafit werden kann."
[1:337]. See 1 HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA: UNFOLDING THE

LATENT PROCESSES OF HIS REASONING 370-99 (1934).
49 JEAN HYPPOLITE, GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 106
(Samuel Chemiak & John Heckman trans., 1974). On Hegel's personal history with Spinozism,
see Hans-Christian Lucas, Spinoza, Hegel, Whitehead: Substance, Subject and Superject, in
HEGEL AND WHITEHEAD: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY 39
(George R. Lucas, Jr., ed. 1986).
50 "[D]ie Versenkung in die BewuBtlosigkeit, die Einheit mit Brahm, die Vemichtung."
[1:338].
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not only unity but union, the conclusion of the syllogism [which] is a
unity possessing content and actuality, a unity which in its wholly
concrete determination is spirit." (328)^'
Like the Brahmans, Spinoza does not manage retum-into-self. The
mode is external and untrue. Truth lies only in substance. "But this is
only to submerge all content in the void, in a merely formal unity
lacking all content," Hegel complains. (328)^2
In Spinoza's thought, the mode is abstract extemality, "indifferent
to qualitative and quantitative determinations." (329)^^
These
"unessential elements are not supposed to count," but, nevertheless,
"everything depends on the kind and maimer of the mode." (329)^"* This
dependence is a confession that the mode belongs to the essential nature
of a thing—"a very indefinite connection but one which at least implies
that this external element is not so abstractly an extemality." (329)^^
1.

A.

SPECIFIC QUANTITY

The Specific Quantum

At the end of Quantity, the Ratio of Powers was "the simple
relation of the quantum to itself, its own determinateness within itself."
(333)^^ In short. Quantity had recaptured its Quality, conceived as
Ratio's immunity from outside manipulation.
Our first step is Immediate Measure:

51 "In der wahrhaften Dreiheit ist nicht nur Einheit, sondem Einigkeit, der SchluB zur
inhaltsvollen und wirklichen Einheit, die in ihrer ganz konkreten Bestimmung der Geist ist,
gebracht." [1:338].
52 "[W]elches dann ein Versenken alles Inhalts in die Leerheit, in nur formelle, inhaltlose
Einheit ist." [1:338].
53 "[D]ie Gleichgilltigheit gegen die qualitativen wie gegen die quantitativen Bestimmungen."
[1:338].
54 "[Das] Unwesentliche nicht ankommen soil, so wird auch wieder in vielem zugestanden,
daB alles auf die Art und Weise ankomme." [1:338]. The Greeks get better marks. They taught
that "everything has a measure." (329) ("[D]aB alles ein MaB hat." [1:338]). This was "the
beginning of a much higher conception than that contained in substance and in the difference of
the mode from the substance." (329) ("[D]er Anfang eines viel hohem Begriffs, als die Substanz
und der Unterschied des Modus von derselben enhalt." [1:339]).
55 "[l]n welcher sehr unbestimmten Beziehung wenigstens dies liegt, daB dies AuBerliche
nicht so abstrakt das AuBerliche sei." [1:338].
56 "[D]ie einfache Beziehung des Quantums auf sich, seine eigene Bestimmheit an sich
selbst." [1:343]. This was one side of the matter. The Ratio of Powers was equally "self-related
extemality." (327) That is, in the ratio
= y, where y is fixed, x is self-determined, but it still
needs that other (external) x to complete its determination.
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Figure 18(a)
Immediate Measure^'^
Immediate measure in Figure 18(a) [1,2] is "an immediate
quantum, hence just some specific quantum or other," but it is equally
an immediate quality, "some specific quality or other." (333)^^ It is
therefore appropriate to represent the mediated nature of Immediate
Measure as a dialectic moment:

Figure 18(b)
Mediated Immediate Measure
The side of Quantum [1] is not indifferent to [2, 3] but is "a selfrelated externality" and hence a Quality (333).^^ For this reason, it is
shown on the left side of the page, which is to be taken is the side of
Being.
Why Immediate Measure, taken as a mediation between quantity
and quality, is a self-relation should by now be apparent. [2] represents
the mediation between [1] and [3], and it is the very being-within-self of
the concept of Measure. But why is this self-relation an externality?
The answer lies in the True Infinite nature of Measure. True Infinimde
requires that [1] go out of itself and into [2], which, as always, instantly
implies that [2] is an externality represented by [3]. Hence, the
externality of Immediate Measure is both inside and outside—[2] and
[3]. Accordingly, Hegel says of the Quanmm [1] that it is distinguished
See the appendix for a descrption of what this drawing means.
58 "[E]in unmittelbares, daher als irgendein bestimmtes Quantum ... sie ist irgendeine
bestimmte Qualitat." [1:343].
59 "[S]elbst beziehende AuBerlichkeit." [1:336].
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from Quality, but "does not transcend it, neither does the quality
transcend the quantum. It is thus the determinateness which has
retumed into simple identity with itself." (333)^"
The metaphysical proposition that these last two logical steps
represent is that "all that exists has a measure" (333),6i the proposition
of the Pythagoreans.^^ Quantum, then, "belongs to the nature of the
something itself." (333)« Quantum is inherent in Being—its beingwithin-self. Accordingly, Being is not indifferent to its magnitude. I
its magnitude is altered, the quality of the thing in question alters as
well. Hence, "Quantum, as measure, has ceased to be a limit which is
not limit; it is now the determination of the thing, which is destroyed if
it is increased or diminished beyond this quantum. (333-34)^
A measured thing exhibits a degree of resilience. It remains what
it is even though its quantum is changed. But eventually there comes a
dramatic moment when the measured thing becomes qualitatively
different. The example of water has already been given.^^ Water has a
liquid quality over a range of temperatures. But if we lower the
quantitative side of water's Measure to below zero degrees centigrade,
water undergoes a sudden cataclysmic change. It turns into ice, which
is qualitatively different from liquid water.
Quantitative determinateness, then, has a double nature. It is (1)
"that to which the quality is tied" and also (2) "that which can be varied
without affecting the quality." (334)^6 immediate Measure brings forth
both moments—the idea that quantitative change destroys the quality of
a being and the idea that quality is indifference to quantitative change.
This prior point proves that "the destruction of anything which has a
measure takes place through the alteration of its quantum.' (334-35)^''
It likewise proves that not every quantitative change is a qualitative
change.
.
The idea of quantitative change that results in qualitative change is
captured by the common sense notion of gradualness. Suppose we
lower the temperature of water with a view of destroying its quality as
liquid (i.e., we make some ice cubes).
60 "[E]s nicht tlber sie hinaus, so wie diese nicht uber dasselbe hinausgeht. Es ist so in le
einfache Gleichheit mil sich zuruckgekehrte Bestimmtheit." [1:343].
61 "Alles, was da ist, hat ein MaB." [1:343],

62 CLARK BUTLER, HEGEL'S LOGIC: BETWEEN DIALECTIC AND HISTORY 111 (1996).

63 "[G]eh6rtzueNatur von Etwasselbst." [1:343].
64 "Das Quantum hat als MaB aufgehort, Grenze zu sein, die keine ist; es ist nunmehr die
Bestimmung der Sache, so daB diese, Uber dies Quantum vermehrt oder vermmdert, zugrunde

ginge." [1:343].
65 fee rapra text accompanying note 6.
. . ,
.
ua
66 "[A]n welche dies Qualitat gebunden ist... an der unbeschadet jener bin- und
hergeaanden werden kaim" [1:344].
• r\
»
67 "[S]o geschieht das Untergehen von etwas, das ein MaB hat, dann, daB sem Quantem
verandert wird." [1:344].
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On the one hand this destraction appears as unexpected, in so far as
the quantum can be changed without altering the measure and the
quality of the thing; but on the other hand, it is made into something
quite easy to understand through the idea of gradualness. The
reason why such ready use is made of this category to render
conceivable or to explain the disappearance of a quality or of
something, is that it seems to make it possible almost to watch the
disappearing with one's eyes, because quantum is posited as the
external limit which is by its nature alterable, and so alteration of
(quantum only) requires no explanation. But in fact nothing is
explained thereby; the alteration is ... essentially the transition of
one quality into another, or the more abstract transition of an
existence into a negation of the existence; this implies another
determination than that of gradualness which is only a decrease or an
increase and is a one-sided holding fast to quantity. (335)^^

In short, incremental change is simply easier to accept as a
psychological matter, eompared to radical qualitative change. Behind
every incrementalist strategy, however, lies the radical program of
obliterating what exists and installing something new.
Hegel asks:
[DJoes the pulling out of a single hair from the head. . . produce
baldness, or does a heap cease to be a heap if a grain is removed?
An answer in the negative can be given without hesitation since such
a removal constitutes only a quantitative difference, a difference
moreover which is itself quite insignificant; thus a hair, a grain, is
removed and this is repeated, only one of them being removed each
time in accordance with the answer given. At last the qualitative
change is revealed; the head ... is bald, the heap has disappeared. In
giving the said answer, what was forgotten was not only the
repetition, but the fact that the individually insignificant quantities
(like the individually insignificant disbursements from a fortune) add
up and the total constitutes the qualitative whole, so that finally this
whole has vanished; the head is bald, the purse is empty. (335).^^

"Dies Untergehen erscheint einesteils als unerwartet, insofem an dem Quantum, ohne das
MaB und die Qualitat zu verandem, geSndert werden kann, andemteils aber wird es zu einem
ganz Begreiflichen gemacht, namlich dutch die Allmahlichkeit. Zu dieser Kategorie wird so
leicht gegriffen, um das Vergehen von einer Qualitdt oder von etwas vorstellig zu machen oder zu
erkldren, indem man so dem Verschwinden beinahe mil den Augen zusehen zu kdnnen scheint,
weil das Quantum als die auBerliche, ihrer Natur nach veranderliche Grenze gesetzt ist, hiemet
die Veranderung, als nut das Quantums, sich von selbst versteht. In der Tat aber wird nichts
dadurch erklart; Die VerSnderung ist. . . wesenlicht der Ubergang einer Qualitat in eine andere,
oder der abstraktere von einem Dasein in ein Nichtdasein; darin liegt eine andere Bestimmungals
in der Allmahlichkeit, welche nur eine Verminderung oder Vermehrung imd das einsetige
Festhalten an der GroBe ist." [1:344-35].
® "[Mjacht [etwa] das Ausraufen Eines Haares vom Kopf.. . kahl, oder hdrt ein haufe auf,
ein Haufe zu sein, wenn ein Kom weggenommen wird? Dies kaim man unbedenklish zugeben,
indem solche Wegnahme nur einen und zwar selbst ganz unbedeutenden quantitativen
Unterschied ausmacht; so wird ein Haar, ein Kom weggenommen und dies so wiederholt, daB
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In the next chapter, Hegel returns to gradualness to suggest that the
gradual, quantitative side of change is external to the thing:
On the qualitative side... the gradual, merely quantitative
progress ... is absolutely interrupted; the new quality in its merely
quantitative relationship is, relatively to the vanishing quality, an
indifferent, indeterminate other, and the transition is therefore a leap
.... People fondly try to make an alteration comprehensible by
means of the gradualness of the transition; but the truth is that
gradualness is an alteration which is merely indifferent, the opposite
of qualitative change. (368).^"
Hegel goes on to complain that gradualism quantifies and therefore
externalizes qualitative change, thereby robbing change of its
immanence. (370-71) Gradualness, in short, subjectifies what should be
an objective process.'^i
Jeanne Schroeder'^^ f^ds in these passages the explanation of some
American constitutional law familiar to every first year law student.
American law permits land use regulation, but if the regulation goes
"too far," it becomes a taking of the land itself. This triggers the
government's obligation to pay just compensation (or to repeal the
oppressive regulation). Thus, regulation's quantitative burden can be
gradually increased with no qualitative change, but there comes a
sudden moment when quantitative change is so great that a qualitative
change is effected. Regulation has become expropriation. This
moment, however, is never present but is always retroactively noted,
after the qualitative change has occurred. For this reason, neither the
Supreme Court nor its innumerable interpreters can say in advance what
constitutes too much regulation, just as we can never specify the exact

jedesmal nach dem, was zugegeben worden, nur Eines weggenommen wird; zuletzt zeigt sich die
qualitative Veranderung, daB der Kopf.. . kahl, der Haufe verschwunden ist. Man vergaB bei
jenem Zugeben nicht nur die Wiederholung, sondem daB sich die ftir sich unbedeutenden
Quantitaten (wie die fUr sich unbedeutenden Ausgaben von einem Vermogen) sutnmieren und die
Suinme das qualitativ Ganze ausmacht, so daB am Ende dieses verschwunden, der Kopf kahl, der
Beutel leer ist." [1:345],
70 "Nach der qualitativen Seite . .. das bloB quantitative Fortgehen der Allmahlichkeit... ist,
absolut abgebrochen; indem die neu eintretende Qualitat nach ihrer bloB quantitativen Beziehimg
eine gegen die verschwindende imdestimmt andre, eine gleichgilltige ist, ist der Ubergang ein
Sprung.... Man sucht sich gem furch die Allmahlichkeit des Ubergangs eine Veranderung
begreiflich zu machen; aber vielmehr ist die Allmahlichkeit gerade die bloB gleichgilltige
Andenmg, das Gegenteil der qualitativen." [1:381].
71 For example, in an attempt to save the American legal system from the nihilism of Critical
Legal Studies, Andrew Altman annoimces that we "more or less" live imder a mle of law. I have
suggested that the invocation "more or less" is designed to lend the American system some
"give," so that counter-examples of lawlessness cannot blow apart the argument. David Gray
Carlson, Liberal Philosophy's Troubled Relation to the Rule of Law, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. 257
(1993).
72 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Never Jam Today: On the Impossibility of Takings Jurisprudence, 84
GEO. L.J. 1531 (1996).
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hair that, if extracted, makes a man bald.''^
Hegel states that common sense errs when it answers that removal
of a single hair does not produce baldness. The mistake is "assuming a
quantity to be only an indifferent limit, i.e. of assuming that it is just a
quantity in the specific sense of quantity." (336)''^ In other words,
quantitative change is thought to have no bite. What common sense
misses is that "quantity is a moment of measure and is connected with
quality." (336)^^ when Quantum is taken as an indifferent limit of a
thing, it leaves the thing "open to unsuspected attack and destruction."
(336)^^ Gradual quantitative change can lead to a catastrophic
coupure?'^
B.

Specifying Measure

If Measure undergoes qualitative change at the alteration of
magnitude, we are in the realm of Immediate Measure. But if we admit
that some quantitative change can occur within a range without any
qualitative change, then we are in the more advanced realm of
Specifying Measure. Here Quality has some independence from
Quantum.'^ Therefore, we have:
Hegel endorses such analytic use of Measure in the Lesser Logic:
It would be a mistake to treat these examples [including that of the bald man] as
pedantic futility; they really turn on thoughts, an acquaintance with which is of great
importance in practical life, especially in ethics. Thus in the matter of expenditure,
there is a certain latitude within which a more or less does not matter; but when the
Measure, imposed by the individual circumstances of the special case, is exceeded on
the one side or the other, the qualitative nature of Measure ... makes itself felt, and a
court, which a moment before was held good economy, tums into avarice or
prodigality.
LESSER LOGIC, supra note *, § 108 Remark.
"[Ejine Quantitat nur fUr cine gleichgilltige Grenze, d.h. sic eben im bestimmten Sinne
einer Quantitat zu nehmen." [1:345].
75 "Moment des MaBes zu sein und mit der Qualitat zusammenzuhangen, konfondiert"
[1:345].
76 "[LF]nverdachtig angegriffen und zugrunde gerichtet wird." [1:346].
77 Hegel further remarks:
It is the cimning of the Notion to seize on this aspect of a reality where its quality
does not seem to come into play; and such is its cunning that the aggrandizement of a
State or of a fortune, etc., which leads finally to disaster for the State or for the owner,
even appears at first to be their good fortune. (336).
"Es ist die List des Begriffes, ein Dasein an dieser Seite zu fassen, von der seine
Qualitat nicht ins Spiel zu kommen scheint,—^imd zwar so sehr, daB VergrdBerung
eines Staats, eines Vermogens usf, welche das Unglilck des Staats, des Besitzers
herbeifuhrt, sogar als dessen Gliick zunachst erscheint." [1:346].
78 As Hegel puts it:
Now that aspect of the quantum according to which it is an indifferent limit which
can be exceeded without altering the quality, is also distinguished from its other aspect
according to which it is qualitative and specific. (336).
Von der Seite nun, nach welcher das Quantum gleichgilltige Grenze ist, an der
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Figure 18(c)
Specifying Measure
As always, Speculative Reason names motion.^^ Gazing back at
Figure 18(b), it notices that Measure can undergo some limited amount
of quantitative change without also undergoing qualitative change.
How does Hegel derive the resilience of quality from quantitative
change? Simply by pointing out that, at this point, resilience is quality:
"As a quantum it is an indifferent magnitude open to external
determination and capable of increase and decrease. But as a measure it
is also distinguished from itself as a quantum, as such an indifferent
determination, and is a limitation of that indifferent fluctuation about a
limit." (334).80
But this does not mean that Quality is now independent of Quantity
and therefore immune from ehange—Quantity being the souree of all
change. "[T]he quantitative determinateness of anything is thus
twofold—namely, it is that to which the quality is tied and also that
which can be varied without affecting the quality." (334)®'
1.

The Rule

The Understanding now intervenes to name the range of
quantitative ehange that Measure might undergo without suffering from
qualitative ehange. Rule is "a measure which is external with referenee
to mere quantum." (336)®^

ohne die Quantitat zu andem hin- und hergegangen werden kann, ist seine andere
Seite, nach welcher as qualitativ, spezifisch ist, auch untershieden. [1:346],
On this aspect of Speculative Reason, see Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 440-41.
80 "Als Quantum ist es gleichgiiltige GrdBe, auBerlicher Bestimmung offen und des Aufunder Abgehens am Mehr und Weniger fahig. Aber als MaB ist es zugleich von sich selbst als
Quantum, als solcher gleichgiiltigen Bestimmung, verscheiden und cine Beschrankung jenes
gleichgiiltigen Hin- und Hergehens an einer Grenze." [1:344],
81 "[D]ie Quantitatsbestimmtheit so an dem Dasein die gedoppelte ist, das cine Mai die, an
welche die Qualitat gebunden ist, das andere Mai aber die, an der unbeschadet jener hin- und
hergegangen werden kann," [1:344],
82 "[E]ine MaB auBerlich gegen das bloBe Quantum," [1:346],

2003]

HEGEL ' S THEORY OF MEASURE

145

Figure 19(a)
Rule
Rule is an intrinsically determinate magnitude. It is Unit to some
other Quantum which is variable Amount. This other Amount is
precisely what is measured by the Rule, which is, after all. Specifying
Measure. Hence, we have:

Figure 19(b)
Rule Measuring Its Other®^
Rule as Unit [1] is external to what it measures [3]. We therefore
have before us an act of mere comparison.®'* Rule as Unit is "an
arbitrary magnitude which in turn can equally be treated as an amount
(the foot as an amount of inches)." (337)®^ Measure, however, is not
The phrase Specifying Measure should be taken to refer to both the Rule and the ruled,
considered together. Therefore, I have named [3]—a one-sided concept—as Specifying Measure
as Amoimt, or "ruled matter."
"Comparison" is an inferior brand of knowledge, according to Hegel. See Carlson,
Quality, supra note 9, at 463-64.
"[E]ine willkurliche GrOfie, die ebenso wieder als Anzahl (der FuB als cine Anzahl von
Zollen) gesetzt werden kann.". [1:347]. Earlier, Hegel remarks that it is "foolish to speak of a
natural standard of things." (334) ("Es ist daher toricht, von einem naturlichen MaBstabe der
Dinge zu Sprechen" [1:344]). Universal standards of measure serve only for external comparison.
The adoption of a universal standard is therefore merely conventional—"a matter of complete
indifference." (334) ("ist es vdllig gleichgilltig"[I:344]). A "foot" might be an internal measure—
where a foot means literally the length of a human being's foot. But where that same foot is
applied to some thing other than itself, it is only an extemal measure.
Anglo-American Lawyers are familiar with the chancellor in equity applying the measiu-e
of his own foot to cases before him:
Equity is a Rouguish thing, for Law we have a measure, know what to trust to. Equity
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merely external Rule. "[A]s a specifying measure [1] its nature is to be
related in its own self [2] to an other which is a quantum [3]." (337)^^
Rule is an important concept for American jurisprudence, with its
emphasis on negative freedom and the rule of law. In the typical (nonHegelian) American vision, the human subject is a natural phenomenon,
with preferences that are simply accepted as given. This natural subject
is free to do what he will within the bounds of the law, which is
imposed on the subject externally—^positive law. The function of the
law is to protect the rights of the next fellow from the exuberance of the
natural subject. In this vision, the negative freedom of the subject
accorded by positive law is the range of quantitative change that a
person can enjoy without qualitative change. If, however, the subject
transgresses the rule of law, the subject undergoes qualitative change—
from lawful to lawless.^'
Hegel endorses the proposition that God is the measure of all
things. Presumably this means that God Rules. God as Measure "is an
external kind and manner of determinateness, a more or less, but at the
same time it is equally reflected into itself, a determinateness which is
not indifferent and external but intrinsic; it is thus the concrete truth of
being" (329)^^ So God is not just external to things but is also implicit
in things. This remark relates to Hegel's characterization of nature as
the non-spiritual - a necessary other to God, which nevertheless
implicitly is spiritual. The inherent spirit in nature is why nature,
ultimately, gives rise to man, reason and mind.^^
2.

Specifying Measure

Rule was external, indifferent magnitude "which is now posited by
some other existence in general in the measurable something." (337)^"
is according to the Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or
narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make the Standard for the
measure we call a Foot the Chancellor's Foot, what an uncertain Measure would this
be! One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a third an indifferent Foot:
'Tis the same thing in the Chancellor's Conscience.

JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 64 (1689).
On the conventionality of units of measurement, Harris protests that "today the physicist,
following Fddington, will claim that there is indeed a natural standard of length, namely, the
radius of curvatiue of space." HARRIS, supra note 5, at 146.
86 "[A]ls spezifisches ist es dies, sich an sich selbst zu einem Andem zu verhalten, das ein
Quantum ist." [1:347].
87 See Carlson, supra note 71, at 268-73.
88 "Aui3erliche Art und Weise, ein Mehr oder Weniger, welches aber zugleich ebenso in sich
reflektiert, nicht bloB gleichgiiltige und auBerliche, sondem an sich seiende Bestimmtheit ist; es
ist so die konkrete Warheit des Seins." [1:339].

See Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 501-506.
90 "[D]ie mm von einer andem Fxistenz tlberhaupt an dem Ftwas des MaBes gesetzt wird."
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Rule signifies the dependence of Measure [2, 3] on externality. Yet,
Specifying Measure, subject to external Rule, is likewise Quantum—an
internal qualitative Quantum. This Quantum is "being-for-other to
which the indifferent increasing and decreasing is proper." (337)^'
As this internal Quantum, [2] in Figure 19(b) is, to a degree,
indifferent to Rule. Accordingly, [2] can equally be taken as the
Quality of [2, 3]. Likewise, since [2] is also Rule, Rule is in some sense
the content of Specifying Measure. Accordingly, the Quantum of Rule
is likewise qualitative—and likewise located in [2]. In effect, [2, 3] and
[1, 2] are two Measures—two separate unities of Quality and
Quantity—facing each other.
It is a feature of Measure that it cannot alter itself. It must be
altered from the outside. But "it does not accept this externally imposed
alteration as an arithmetical amount." (337)^^ Rather, the Measure
alters at its own pace. By way of example, if you wish to bake a cake,
you tium the oven on and place the batter inside the oven. The oven
heats up faster than the cake batter. The heat of the oven of course can
be measured. The cake batter stands for the ruled matter [3]. It needs
the oven to be altered from batter to cake, but it obstinately bakes at its
own rate and takes longer to heat up (and undergo the qualitative
change from batter to cake) than the ambient air in the oven.
Meanwhile, the batter influences the oven as well. The oven full of
cake batter heats up at a slower rate than an empty oven. Each
Measure—^batter and oven temperature—influences the other's rate of
change.
The ruled matter [3] (or, in my example, cake batter) reacts against
externally imposed matter (the oven) and "behaves towards the amount
[2] as an intensive quantum." (337)'^ Why this reference to Intensive
Quantum? This concept (also called Degree and Intensive Magnitude)
is shown in Figure 14(b) in a negative mode and again in Figure 15(a)
in its positive mode.^^
Degree, Quantum recaptured some measure of
its Being-for-self. It stood over against Extensive Magnitude. In Figure
14(b), Extensive Magnitude saw itself as a plurality and announced, "I
am not a unit." Intensive Magnitude therefore represented the unit that
Extensive Magnitude was not. In Degree, "determinate being has
returned into being-for-self." (218)^^
Ruled matter (Specifying Measure as Amount) likewise has beingfor-self [3] which resists externally imposed change. Of course, it is not
[1:347],
91 "Seins-fUr-Anderes an ihm, der das gleichgultige Vermehrt- und Vermindertwerden
zukommt." [1:347],
92 "[E]s nimmt davon nicht die arithmetische Menge an," [1:347],
93 "[R]eagiert dagegen, verhalt sich als ein Intensives gegen die Menge," [1:347],
99 See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2070-74,
95 "[D]as Dasein in das Fiirsiehsein zuruckgegangen," [1:214],
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entirely immune. The cake cooks, but it does so at its own leisure, not
at the rate the ambient air of the oven wishes. This is why it takes forty
minutes to bake a cake and why a watched pot never boils.
This resistance of ruled matter also explains Hegel's earlier remark
that Measure, in its more developed form, is necessity, or fate. Thus,
Nemesis attacks those who are presumptuous, who think themselves too
great. By bringing down the presumptuous and reducing them to
nothing, "mediocrity is restored," Hegel remarks. (329)^^
Fate is Specifying Measure as Amoimt, which resists the subjective
will of presumptuous rulers. Human society insists on its own rate of
quantitative (and eventually qualitative) change. Those who insist on
speeding up the rate of change are taught a hard lesson that bureaucracy
has a quality of its own. Its quality is its own unique rate of change.
Nevertheless, human institutions do change, and they require impatient
reformers to work hard in order to effectuate that change. This is why
Rome was not built in a day.
Ratio of Measures. In Figure 19(b), two Measures face each other
and form a unique Ratio of Measures which is an "exponent"^"' different
from either Measure. (337) The Ratio of Measures, sometimes called
Realized Measure or Specified Measure, is shown in Figure 19(c):

Figure 19(c)
Ratio of Measures
(Realized or Specified Measure)
In Figure 19(c), the two Measures, each an arithmetic progression
within which neither undergoes quantitative change, produce yet a third
arithmetic progression, which is different from the "incommensurable
96 "[D]ie MittelmaBigkeit, hergestellt werde." [1:339]. This may be a comment on the fall of
Napoleon. In a private letter, Hegel commented on the event: "There is nothing more tragic ....
The entire mass of mediocrity, with its irresistible leaden weight of gravity, presses on, without
rest or reconciliation, until it succeeded in bringing down what is high to the same level or even
below." JACQUES D'HONDT, HEGEL IN HIS TIME: BERLIN, 1818-1831 31 (John Burbidge trans.,
1988). A believer in historical greatness, Hegel showed a lack of patience for historians who
sought to remove the halo from heroes by pointing out base motives for their great acts. "If
heroes of history had been actuated by subjective and formal interests alone, they would never
have accomplished what they have." LESSER LOGIC, supra note 6, § 140 Remark.
97 Oddly, Hegel uses the term "exponent" to describe what we might call a quotient. Carlson,
Quantity, supra note 4, at 2098 & n.I81. Thus, if A/B = C, Hegel calls C the exponent.
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ratios" (138)98 that make it up.99 Alteration of the Measure, then,
consists by itself in the addition of such a numerical one and then
another and so on. If in this way the alteration of the extemal
quantum is an arithmetical progression, the specifying reaction of the
qualitative natiue of measure produces another series which is
related to the first, increases and decreases with it, but not in a ratio
determined by a numerical exponent but in a number of
incommensurable ratios, according to a determination of powers.
(338)100

This new range of values is the qualitative moment of the Ratio of
Measure, and it is "the qualitative moment itself which specifies the
quantum as such." (338)ioi What this implies is that, when a Measure is
observed (or Specified), the reality of the Measure is validly observed.
Yet, the Measure in part escapes observation—the unmeasured thing [3]
lies beyond the Ratio of Measures that is actually observed [4, 6]. In
short, to measure a thing is to change it.
a.

Remark

In the Remark following Rule and Specifying Measure, Hegel
gives temperature as an example of the Ratio of Measures. In
temperature, he says, "two sides of extemal and specified quantum are
98 "[I]nkoinmensurabeln Verhaltnisse." [1:348].
99 Hegel compares Figure 19(c) to the progress conceming Intensive Quantum and Extensive
Quantum. In Figures 14 and 15, each of these ideas was promoted in tum by the Understanding.
In Figure 14(a), Extensive Quantum (or Extensive Magnitude) was presented as representing
Amoimt. Then a single Degree was brought to the fore as primus inter pares of all the
numbers—i.e., the lOOth degree. The Understanding next grabbed hold of Intensive Quantum (or
Degree). But Dialectical Reason showed that Degree was dependent on plurality for its identity.
Thus, the 100th degree was incoherent without an extemal reference to lst-99th degree and 101st
degree and higher. See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 1068-74. Throughout this process,
Hegel now writes, "the quantum lying at the base suffers no alteration, the difference being only
an outer form." (338) ("Das zugrunde liegende Quantum erleidet in diesem Unterschiede Keine
Veranderung, dieser ist nur cine auBere Form" [1:348]). Specifying Measure is different. Here,
"the quantum is taken in the first instance in its immediate magnitude [1], but in the second
instance it is taken through the exponent of the ratio [2] in another amount [3]." (338) ("hingegen
ist das Quantum das cine Mai in seiner unmittelbaren Gr6l3e, das andere Mai aber wird es durch
den Verhaltnisexpontenten in einer andem Anzahl genommen" [1:348]. The point seems to be
that each Measure alters the other (through quantitative change). Measure therefore has physical
consequence, whereas the alteration between Extensive and Intensive Magnitude did not.
100 "[B]esteht flir sich in dem Hinzutreten eines solchen numerischen Eins und wieder eines
solchen usf. Wenn so das auBerliche Quantum in arithmetischer Progression sich verandert, so
bringt die spezifizierende Reaktion der qualitativen Natur des MaBes cine andere Reihe hervor,
wleche sich auf die erste bezieht, mit ihr zu- und adnimmt, aber nicht in einem durch einen
Zahlenexpontenten bestimmten, sondem einer Zahl inkommensurabeln Verhaltnisse, nach einer
Potenzenbestimmung." [1:348].
101 "[D]as Moment des Qualitativen selbst zu verstehen, welches das Quantum als solches
spezifiert." [1:348],
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distinguished." (338)'02 The temperature of a body is registered in the
external quantum of yet another body—mercury in a thermometer, for
instance. Yet, the body of a sick child and the thermometer differ in the
rate at which they absorb temperature. The child's temperature affects
the thermometer, but (it is forgotten) the thermometer affects the
temperature of the child, "and the change of temperature in any one of
them does not correspond in a direct ratio with that of the medium or of
the other bodies among themselves." (338-39)'"^ Each body has a
"specific heat."'®'' Temperature is in fact a ratio that differs from the
temperature of either side of the ratio of child and thermometer.
The Ratio of Measures must not be looked at as the relation of
mere Quantity to Quality. "In fact," Hegel writes, "the determining of
the specifying ratio has now advanced to the stage where the moments
of measure not only consist of a quantitative side and a side qualifying
the quantum, both being sides of one and the same quality, but are
related to each other as two qualities which are in themselves
measures." (339)'®^ In short, two complete Measures face each other,
and produce yet another Measure which is a middle term—^though
mistakenly taken as being the truth of the Specified Measure.
3.

Relation of the two Sides as Qualities

In Figure 19(c), the qualitative side of the Ratio of Measures is
intrinsic yet determinate (i.e., constituted by Quantity). The quantitative
side is said to be external [1]. But this externality is sublated and
becomes internal [4, 5]. "This qualitative side," Hegel concludes, "thus
has a quantum for its presupposition and its starting point." (339)'®® I n
other words, quality presupposes an externality, and, as we are still in
the realm of Being, this externality is still taken as the starting point for
determining what the thing is.
The external Quantity, however, has a quality of its own and so is
qualitatively distinguishable from its other. Each Measure in the ratio is
qualitatively distinguishable, and this very difference is their unity.
102 "[D]iese beiden Seiten, auBerliches und spezifiertes Quantum zu sein, unterscheiden."
[1:348],
103 "[D]ie Temperaturveranderung deselben nicht der des Mediums oder ihrer untereinander
im direlUen Verhaltnisse entspricht." [1:349],
10'' In physics, "specific heat" is the ratio of (a) the quantity of heat required to raise the
temperature of a body one degree to (b) the quantity of heat required to raise the temperature of
an equal mass of water one degree,
105 "Wie sich das spezifizierende Verhaltnis gleich weiter bestimmen wird, dafi die Momente
des MaBes nicht nur in einer quantitativen und enier das Quantum qualifizierenden Seite einer
und derselben Qualitat bestehen, sondem im Verhaltnisse zweier Quanlitaten, welche an ihnen
selbst MaBe sind," [1:349],
106 "[S]ie hat so dasselbe zu ihrer Vorausserzung und fangt von ihm an," [1:349],

2003]

HEGEL ' S THEORY OF MEASURE

151

This qualitative difference [2] is now sublated in the Ratio of Measures.
It is "now to be posited in the immediacy of being as such, in which
determination measure still is." (339)"'7 That is, externality is sublated,
and Measure embraces immediacy.
Each of the two sides is qualitatively related and yet each is itself a
Determinate Being—hence both qualitative and quantitative. The unity
of the two extremes (each a Measure) is likewise a Measure. "Measure
is thus the immanent quantitative relationship of two qualities to each
other." (340)109
Measure now has "variable magnitude^ (340)iio Quantum is
sublated, so that it is no longer Quantum—determined extemally. Now
it is "quantum and something else." (340)i'i This additional something
is a qualitative element and "nothing else than its relation of powers."
(340)112 In Immediate Measure, alteration was not yet posited. Any
change in the "arbitrary, single quantum" (340)ii2 likewise changed the
quality of the Measure. In Specifying Measure, however, we have "an
alteration of the merely external quantum by the qualitative element."
(340)111 A distinction is now posited between two specific magnitudes.
There is a plurality of Measures constituting the Ratio of Measures,
which is itself external to its two sides—as shown as [7] in Figure 19(c).
Each side is to be distinguished from the Ratio of Measures [2, 4]. "It is
in this distinguishedness of the quantum from itself—i.e., from each
individual side—that a Measure "first shows itself to be a real
[daseiendes] measure." (340)ii5 In this guise of distinguishing itself—
[1] or [3]—from itself [2], each Measure "now appears as a Determinate
Being which is both one and the same (e.g. the constant temperature of
the medium), and also quantitatively varied (in the different
temperatures of the bodies present in the medium)." (340)"^ In other
lO'' "[DJieser Unterschied beider ist in der Unmittelbarkeit des Seins ttberhaupt, in welcher das
Mafi noch ist, zu setzen." [1:349].
108 In his account of Measure, John Burbidge tends to say things like "measurement is ...
nothing but a proportion between two numbers." BURBIDGE, REAL PROCESS, supra note 12, at
46. But it is very important to see the extremes as, not just numbers, but themselves independent
Measures, the middle term of which is a metonymic "average" which we take to be the measure
of a thing. To say that the extremes are mere numbers is to omit that they are more than numbers.
They are Measures in and of themselves.
109 "Das MaB ist so das immanente quantitative Verhalten zweier Qualitaten zueinander."
[1:350].
110 "[V]eranderlichen GroBe." [1:350].
111 "[A]ls Quantum und zugleich als etwas anderes." [1:350].
112 "[N]ichts anderes als das Potenzenverhaltnis desselben." [1:350].
113 "[l]rgend und zwar ein einzelnes Quantum." [1:350].
11'l "[E]iner Veranderung des bloB auBerlichen Quantums durch das Qualitative." [1:350].
115 "[D]as Quantum zeigt sich est als daseiendes MaB in solcher Unterschiefenheit seiner von
sich selbst indem es." [1:350].
110 "[E]ein und dasselbe (z. B. dieselbe Temperatur des Mediums), zugleich als verschiedes
und zwar quantitatives Dasein (—in den verschiedenen Temperaturen der in jenem befindlichen
Kdrper) hervortritt." [1:350].
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words, the Measures are both the Ratio of Measures and not the Ratio of
Measures.
In the Ratio of Measures (or Realized Measure), one side of the
ratio is Amount, "which increases and decreases in an external
arithmetical progression." (341)"^ This is the external Measure which
is applied against the measured material. This is, for instance, the
thermometer in the baby. The other side is the measured materialUnit to the external Amount. This would be the baby. But which side
is which? Since the baby affects the thermometer as well as the
thermometer affecting the baby, only external will can discern the
difference. For themselves, "it is immaterial which is regarded as
increasing or decreasing merely externally in arithmetical progression,
and which, on the other hand, [is] specifically determining the other
quantum." (341)"^
Nevertheless, Rule and Specifying Measure as Amount must be
present. Furthermore, the quality of one side of the ratio must be
"extensive," and the other must be "intensive." Extensiveness stands
for externality. Extensive quantity is Amount, power, and becomingother. Intensiveness stands for being-within-self which is immune
from, or "negative relatively" to, the other. (341)''^ Intensive quantity
is Unit and root.
a.

Remark

In this remark, Hegel expostulates on velocity
If s/t is
merely taken as a Direct Ratio {A/B = Q , then "it is immaterial which
of the two moments is to be considered as amount or as unit." (342)'2i
A Direct Ratio is merely a "formal determination which has no
existence except as an intellectual abstraction." (342)'22 Even if the
Direct Ratio is the ratio of root and square (s - a?—Galileo's formula

117 " [D]ie in auflerlicher, arithmetischer Progression auf- und adgeht." [1:351].
11^ "[I]st es gleichvel, an welcher die Vermehrung oder Verminderung als bloB auBerlich, in
arithmetisher Progression fortgehend, und welche dagegen als an diessem Quantum sich
spezifisch bestimmend angehesen wird." [1:351],
119 "Negative gegenjene." [1:351],
120 Here, s = space and t = time,
121 "[S]o ist es gleichgiiltig, welches von beiden Momenten als die Anzahl oder als die Einheit
betrachtet werden soli," [1:352], Direct Ratio is shown in Figure 17(a), See Carlson, Quantity,
supra note 4, at 2141, In Direct Ratio {A/B = C), either A or B could be Amount in which case
either 1/A or 1/B was Unit, The problem with Direct Ratio was that both sides of the equation
could be multiplied by B/C or A/C, in which case the "exponent" (or quotient) could equally be
said to be Unit or Amount,
122 "[Z]ur formellen, nicht existierenden, sondem nur der abstrahierenden Reflexion
Betsimmung," [1:352],
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for the speed of falling bodies),123 the root (t) is an empirical, external
quantum. The other side {s, as in a = s/t^) is "taken as specified."
(342)124

The Ratio of Measures is more advanced, Hegel says, than the
Direct Ratio. The logic of Measure requires "the qualifying of the
quantitative." (342)i25 Because Measure brings to the fore the quality of
both sides of the Ratio of Measures, 5^ = at^ (Kepler's third law
concerning the motion of planets)i26 is more "notional, because "both
sides are related to each other in higher determinations of powers."
(342)127

At the level of Ratio of Measures, space, "like weight in specific
gravity, is an external, real whole as such—^hence amount—^whereas
time, like volume, is the ideal, negative factor, the side of unity."
(342)12^ In other words, velocity is measured in units of time. Time is
therefore internal and qualitative to velocity, but also negative, as time
is a self-devouring "absolute coming-out-of-itself." (189)i29
Presumably, this means that the outside measurer can manipulate space
traversed because she is in control of acceleration. But, no matter what
she does, she cannot speed up or slow down the clock—^not at least in a
Newtonian universe.
Kepler's formula expresses "that which holds between the
magnitudes of space and time in free motion." (342)'2o jt is a formula
more important than the formula for mere velocity. Hegel had earlier
said that the free motion of celestial bodies "is determined solely by the
Notion." (332)121 jhat is, there is nothing contingent about the way the
123 s = ai c&n be viewed as Direct Ratio if it is taken as a = stl/O- The hallmark of Direct
Ratio (A/B = C) is that, as A grows, B does as well. In Indirect Ratio (A = BC), as B grows C
shrinks. The difference between Direct and Indirect Ratio is that, in Direct Ratio, the
mathematician may switch the exponent with one of the sides. In Indirect Ratio, the exponent is
fixed, which exhibits a qualitative resistance to external manipulation. That is, in .4 = BC, if A is
fixed, C can shrink (in which case B grows). But C can never shrink to zero without destroying
the exponent. See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2143-44.
124 "[A]ls spezifiert zu nehmen ist." [1:352].
125 "Realisation d'er Qualifikation des Quantitativen." [1:352].
126 Here, s stands for the semimajor axis of an ellipse—i.e., the farthest distance possible
between the planet and the center of the sun. The variable t stands for the period of the orbit (for
earth, one year).
127 "[D]al3 beide Seiten in hohem Potenzenbestimmungen ... sich verhalten." [1:352].
128 "[W]ie in der spezifischen Schwere das Gewicht, ist auBerliches reales Ganzes Uberhaupt,
somit Anzahl, die Zeit hingegen,... wie das Volumen, ist das Ideele, das Negative, die Seite der
Einheit." [1:352]. Specific gravity is the ratio of (a) the density of a substance to (b) the density of
some other substance (i.e., pure water taken at its maximum density at 4°C, when both densdies
are obtained by weighing the substances in air. For instance, if one cubic inch of gold weighs
19.3 times as much as one cubic inch of water, the specific gravity of gold is 19.3).
129 "[E]in absolutes AuBersichkommen." [1:182].
130 "[D]aB in der freien Bewegung,—zuerst der noch des Falls—Zeit- und Raum-Quantitat."
[1:352-53].

131 "[N]ur durch den Begriff bestimmte." [1:341].

Einsteinian. HARRIS, supra note 5, at 146.
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planets, in their evil mixture, move about the glorious planet Sol
(according to Kepler's r' In fact, Hegel stiggests such ftee
motion rests "on the nature of the interrelated qualities of sp^e and
time" (342)1" in Kepler's ratio, time and space are said to be
''inseparable and their quantitative relationship is the being-for-self of
measure " (343)'" Thus, time and space bear the relation that by/ox
bears in'calculus. Neither 5y nor 5x has any meaning separate from
their ratio. The ratio is what bore the Being-for-self of the denvative.
A true science, Hegel now reminds us, carmot be merely empirical,
though this work is admittedly useful. Little has been done however,
with regard to Measure which is "strictly scientific (i.e., nonempirical) (343)'^^ "It is a great service to ascertain the empincal
numbers of nature, e.g. the distance of the planets from one anothen"
(343)'" It is "an infinitely greater"'" service, however, when the
empirical numbers disappear and the universal forms (natural laws) are
manifested'"—"immortal service which Galileo for the descent of

132 As Shakespeare describes the planets:
The heavens themselves, the planets, and this centre,
Observe degree, priority, and place,
Insisture, course, proportion, season, form,
Office, and custom, in all line of order
And therefore is the glorious planet Sol
In noble eminence enthroned and sphered
Amidst the other; whose med'cinable eye
Corrects the ill aspects of planets evil.
And posts, like the commandment of a king,
Sans check, to good and bad; but when the planets.
In evil mixture, to disorder wander,
What plagues and what portents, what mutiny,
What raging of the sea, shaking of earth.
Commotion in the winds, frights, changes, horrors,
Divert and crack, rend and deracinate
The unity and married calm of states
Quite from their fixure?
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA act 1, sc. 3.
n-rssi
133 "iDler Natur der im Verhalmis stehenden Qualitaten des Raums under der Zeit. [1.353T
The motion of falling bodies (s = at"), however, and mechanical motion m general are said to be
conditioned (342). Presumably this means that falling bodies start from rest and are impelled by
external force to move. Not so with the happy planets, which simply move accordmg

"with regard to unfree mechanical motion, Hegel says that the time factor (t) is said to be
the root and the space factor is a square—that is, s is a function oft'. With the planets, howeve^
the period of revolution around the sun (s') is one power higher than that of space (because
"[U]ntrennbar .. ., und ihr quantitatives Verhalmis das Fiirsichsein des Mafles." [1:353].
135 "fEhgentlich wissenchaftlich." [1:353].
136 "Es ist ein groBes Verdienst, die empirischen Zahlen der Natur kennen zu lemen, z.
Entfemungen der Planeten voneinander." [1:353].
138 TS"S^ refe^ncrtoK
note 4.

.

early dissertation De Orbitus Planetarum. See supra
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falling bodies and Kepler for the motion of the celestial bodies have
achieved." (343)^^^ These laws were induced from mere experience.
"But yet a still higher proof is required for these laws." (343)''*'' The
laws must be proven from the very notions of time and space
themselves."Of this kind of proof there is still no trace in the said
mathematical principles of natural philosophy." (343)'''2
C.

Being-For-Self in Measure

The Ratio of Measures (or Specified Measure) has a Being-forself. Being-for-self—the final segment of Quality—^represented selfannihilation. More precisely, the truth of finite Being was that it ceased
to be. Similarly, the Being-for-self of measure is also self-annihilation.
In Figure 19(c), the extremes had quantitative elements that were
qualitatively determined. In other words, each extreme making up the
Ratio of Measures was itself a Measure, as shown in Figure 19(c).
These extremes had an existence that exceeded the Specified Measure—
[1] and [3] in Figure 19(c). As such, they are "so far posited only as
immediate, merely different qualities." (344)'''3 They do not have the
continuous nature of their quantitative side and indeed have a meaning
of their own quite divorced from the ratio in which they participate. In
short, [1] is space and [3] is time, if we consider velocity. Each can be
139 "[U]nsterbliche Verdienste, die sich z.B. Galilei in Rtlcksicht auf den Fall und Kepler in
Riicksicht auf die Bewegung der himmlischen Kdrper erworben hat." [1:353].
140 "Es ijjuB aber noch ein hbheres Beweisen dieser Gesetze gefordert werden." [1:354].
141 Professor Harris reads this appeal as one that Einstein would answer in the twentieth
century. HARRIS, supra note 5, at 143.
142 "Von dieser Art des Beweisens findet sich in jenen mathematischen Prinzipien der
Naturphilosopie." [1:354]. For a description of Hegel's attempt to "notionalize" Galileo's law,
see Stefan Butner, Hegel on Galilei's Law of Fall, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4,
at 331, 337-38.
Hegel goes on here to complain again of Newton's attempt to deduce the physics of the
natural world from the calculus. "These proofs presuppose their theorems, those very laws, from
experience; what they succeed in doing is to reduce them to abstract expressions and convenient
formulae." (343) ("Diese Beweise setzen ihre Theoreme, eben jene Gesetzt, aus der Erfahrung
voraus."[l:354]). Hegel predicts:
Undoubtedly the time will come when, with a clearer understanding of what
mathematics can accomplish and has accomplished, the entire, real merit of Newton as
against Kepler—the sham scaffolding of proofs heing discarded—^will clearly be seen
to be restricted to the said transformation of Kepler's formula. (343-44) (footnote
omitted).
Das ganze reelle Verdienst, das Newton im Vorzug gegen Kepler in Beziehung auf die
namlichen Gegenstande zugeschrieben wird, wird—das ScheingerUste von Beweisen
abgezogen—ohne Zweifel bei gereinigterer Reflexion Uber das, was die Mathematik zu
leisten vermag und was sie geleistet hat, einst mit deutlicher Kenntnis auf jene
Umformung des Ausdrucks. [1:354] (footnote omitted).
On Hegel's earlier attack on Newton, see Carlson, Quantity, supra noX& A, at 2110-11.
143 "[D]ie Qualitaten nur erst noch als unmittelhare, nur verschiedene gesetz." [1:354].
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seen to operate independently of the other.
If [1] and [3] are immediate qualities, [2] must be the quantitative
side of Measure. But [2] is just as immediate—qualitative—as [1] and
[3] are. Simultaneously, [2] is just as much a part of [1, 2] and [2, 3] as
[1] and [3] are respectively. Hence, the immediate quality is just as
much an immediate quantum.
The quantitative aspect of the Ratio of Measures is what can be
altered externally. Consequently, the Ratio of Measures is in part
beyond itself—subject to outside control. That is, [4, 5] of the Ratio is
just as much [1] because [4, 5] participates in the externality of [1, 2, 4,
5]; likewise [4, 6] is just as much [3]. Accordingly, "[qjuality and
quantum as thus also appearing outside the specific measure [or Ratio of
Measures] are at the same time correlated with it." (344)^'^''
External Quantum, then, is part of the Ratio of Measures, but it is
"externally given." (345)1^5 xhis givenness by an external measurer
(who now replaces the external mathematician in the Quantity chapters)
is "the negation of the qualitative determination of measure." (345)i'*^
This negation of the qualitative aspect of the Ratio of Measures is
nevertheless inside the Ratio of Measures—on the law of sublation.
Hence, the qualitative heart of the Ratio of Measures is its quantitative
promiscuity toward outside manipulation. This negativity at the heart of
the Ratio of Measures is the Being-for-self of that entity. For this
reason, Hegel says that "[t]he qualitative element thus masks itself,
specifying not itself but the quantitative determinateness." (344)i^'' In
short, the Ratio of Measures is telling us what it is not. It is not
independent from outside manipulation, and this susceptibility is
precisely its quality.
Specified Measure is still specified. It is the qualitative "unit
appearing as empirical, in the quantitative side of measure." (345)^''^
But, even if its empirical unit is given to it, its true Being-for-self is
hidden and still implicit. Its freedom from Specifying Measures is not
yet truly "for-itself." For now, it is still a Determinate Being—"the
quotient or exponent of a direct ratio between the sides of the measure.
(345)150

144 "Qualitat und Quantum auch so auBer dem spezifischen MaBe auftretend, sind zugleich in
der Beziehung auf dieses." [1:355].
145 "[AjuBerlich gegebenes." [1:355].
146 "[D]ie Negation der qualitativen MaBbestimmung." [1:355].
147 "Das Qualitative verhiillt sich so, als nicht sich selbst, sondem die GroBebestimmtheit
spezifierend." [1:354-55].
148 Writing of the passage just explicated, Cinzia Ferrini remarks, "It is clear that for Hegel the
empirical numbers of nature are now 'an sich' captured by the conceptual net... which reveals
something basic to them: namely, ther qualitative aspect." Ferrini, Framing, supra note 4, at 299.
149 "Empirisch erscheinende Einheit in dem Quantitativen des MaBes." [1:356].
150 "Quotient oder Exponent als eines Verhaltnisses der Seiten des MaBes, dies Verhaltnis als
ein direktes genommen." [1:356].
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Falling Bodies. Hegel returns to the falling body, which moves
according to 5 = af. This is a Ratio of Powers—a qualitative "natural"
feature of all bodies that fall. As a mere mathematical expression,
however, it is merely a Direct Ratio, in which space and time are
indifferently brought together.
The velocity of an accelerating body is an expression of space
traversed in the very first Unit of time.'^' That is, the accelerating body
has an average velocity, which is never its true speed. In the statement
of velocity (for example, 25 MPH)—space is Amount as "determined
by the specifying measure." (345)'^^ That is, the falling object does not
demand that it fall 25 miles. This criterion is imposed upon it. Yet,
since we are considering the law of falling bodies as a Direct Ratio,
space is just as much exponent as Amount. The velocity found by the
measurer is therefore "the merely formal velocity which is not
specifically determined by the Notion." (345)'53 The velocity at the first
imit of time does not actually exist, nor does the velocity at the last unit
of time. Velocity is merely an average parading as the true velocity at
any given unit of time.^^'' "[TJhis so-called unit of time is itself only an
assumed unit and has as such atomic point no real being." (345-46)'^^
The real Being-for-self in velocity is the constant a. "The same co
efficient a remains in all the following units of time," Hegel notes.
( 3 4 5 ) H e r e is what is really internal to velocity. Space and time are
externally imposed on the Measure. Yet, it is Being-for-self "only in so
far as this moment is unexplicated [an sichl and hence an immediacy."
(346)15"' In short, the Being-for-self of the Specified Measure is
precisely not its empirical measure.
Hegel concludes the first chapter of Measure by stating, "Measure
151 Why is time "Unit?" According to one commentator, "the qualitative moment of time
constitutes a being-for-self, time being negatively related to itself in a manner which is still
entirely abstract. It is because of this that it qualifies as the relational unit and therefore as a
denominator." Butner, supra note 142, at 338.
152 "[D]urch das spezifizierende MaB bestimmte Aehl." [1:356].
'53 "[F]ormellen, nicht durch den Begriff spezifisch bestimmten Geschwindigkeit." [1:356].
'54 "Fall, therefore, would be only a truly uniformly accelerated motion if the radius of the
Earth were infinite, or, as Popper realized, if the height of the fall were zero. Paradoxically
enough, only if the movement it involves were not a fall, would the law governing it be realized
as a imiformly accelerated motion." Butner, supra note 142, at 336 (citing KARL R. POPPER, THE

LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1986)).
'55 "[D]ieser sogenannte Zeitmoment ist cine selbst nur angenommene Einheit und hat als
solcher atomer Punkt kein Dasein." [1:356]. According to the Science of Logic's translator,
"[t]his certainly indicates that he thought that the concrete sciences systematized in the
Philosophy of Nature are dealing only with a sort of outer appearance, that the inner reality of the
measurements and calculations by means of which they make their subject matter intelligible has
to be sought here in the Logic ..." Arnold Vincent Miller, Defending Hegel's Philosophy of
Nature, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 103, 112.
156 "[D]erselbe Koeffizient a bliebt in alien fiilgenden zeitpunkten." ersten Zeitmoment sein."
[1:356].
'52 "[I]nsofem dasselbe an sich und daher als unmittelbares ist." [1:357].
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has now acquired the character of a specified quantitative relation
which, as qualitative, has in it the ordinary external quantum." (346)'^^
But Measure is not just this Quantum. It is "a fixed exponent." (346)'59
As such. Measure has an integrity against the measurer. This qualitative
aspect of the Measure in fact belies the quantitative expression. No
quantum can ever state the true speed of the falling body at any given
moment. Thus, Measure has two sides—each of which is a Measure.
One side is "immediate and external, and the other immanently
specified."'®" (347) That these two moments are unified in Figure 19(c)
"means that measure is now. . . realised" (347)'®' In this realization,
however, "[t]he self-determination of the relation is thus negated."
(347)'®2 Its explicit determinateness comes from its external other.
Measure was supposed to be qualitative in its own self, "but possesses
in truth such qualitative determinateness only in the other side of the
relation." (347)'®3
Measure is thus merely a negative unity—"a real being-for-self,
the category of a something as a unity of qualities which are related as
measures." (347)'®'' Although the Specifying Measures are extemal and
given to the Specified Measure, the Specified Measure nevertheless is
"a complete self-subsistent something." (347)'®® Meanwhile, the two
extremes of this something are each repulsed "into distinct selfsubsistent somethings whose qualitative nature and subsistence
(materiality) lies in their measure determinateness." (347)'®®
II.

REAL MEASURE

Specified Measure (indifferently called the Ratio of Measures or
Realized Measure) is by now "a correlation of measures," (348)'®'' and it
was precisely this correlation that constituted the quality of the
empirical something. The fate of this correlation now occupies our
attention. Thus, whereas the first chapter in Measure was prepositional
{i.e., the province of the Understanding), the current chapter is dialectic
158 "Das Mal3 hat sich dahin bestimmt, ein spezifiziertes GroBverhaltnis zu sein, das als
qualitativ das gewohnliche auBerliche Quantum an ihm hat." [1:357].
159 "[E]in unveranderlicher Exponent." [1:357].
160 "[U]nmittelbares. auBerliches, und als in sich spezifiziertes." [1:357].
161 "[D]as Mal3 nun auf diese Weise realisiert ist." [1:357].
162 "[S]eine Selbstbestimmung ist darin negiert." [1:358].
163 "[A]n jenem erst in Wahrheit die qualitative Bestimmheit." [1:358].
164 "[Rjeales Fiirsichsein, die Kategorie eines Etwas, als Einheit von QualitSten, die im
MaBverhaltnisse sind." [1:358].
1®5 "[E]ine voile Selhstandigkeit." [1:358].
166 "[ijn unterschiedene Selbstandige, deren qualitative Natur und Bestehen (Materialitat) in
ihrer MaBbestimmtheit liegt." [1:358].
167 "Beziehung von MaBen." [1:358].
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in nature.'®^
In Specified Measure, relations concerned "abstract qualities like
space and time." (348)'^^ These were earlier said to be inseparable.
(342) Now concepts like specific gravityand chemical properties
take the stage.i'^^ These are "determinations characteristic of material
existence." (348)'^^ Because the Ratio of Measures is the puck over
which two resiliant Measures face off, the Measures can now be
considered separable and, eventually, entirely dispensable from the
middle term.
Hegel begins by summarizing the crosses to be borne and the perils
to ensue. Real Measure is first "a self-subsistent measure of a material
Harris and Mure frankly proclaim the second chapter of Measure in the Science of Logic to
be incomprehensible and aimounce that they will analyze the simpler discussion of the Lesser
Logic only. HARRIS, supra note 5, at 145; MURE, supra note 1, at 121-22. Another commentator
suggests Hegel's contributions to natural science have not been well received:
On the one hand, natural scientists considered Hegel's Philosophy of Nature to be
hocus-pocus, drastically contradicted by the progress in chemistry and physics, and
discredited all passages of Hegel's Science of Logic in which models from the
Philosophy of Nature played a role. On the other hand, philosophers tried to keep the
Science of Logic independent of every specific material that had become obsolete by
scientific progress.
Ulrich Ruschig, Logic and Chemistry in Hegel's Philosophy, 7 INT'L J. PHIL. CHEMISTRY 5, 6
(2001). John Burbidge, however, provides a lengthy and sympathetic account of this chapter. He
reports that the chapter was substantially revised in the 1831 edition of the Science of Logic, to
account for new developments in chemistry since 1813. JOHN W. BURBIDGE, REAL PROCESS,
supra note 12, at 56-58.
169 "[AJbstrakten Qualitat wie dem Raume und der Zeit." [1:358].
l''" Specific gravity, it will be recalled, is the ratio of (a) the density of a substance to (b) the
density of some other substance, when both densities are obtained by weighing the substances in
air. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
121 Clark Butler suggests that the first chapter of Measure concerned physics, while the second
chapter stands for chemistry. He puts it this way:
The Logic distinguishes between ideal measurement by stipulated units of a universal
physical variable (such as force) and real measurement by natural units of a particular
element of compound (such as water or salt). Ideal measures are found in physics, real
measures in chemistry. Chemistry distinguishes particular material compounds, while
physics (mechanics) distinguishes universal properties of matter everywhere.
BUTLER, supra note 62, at 112. It must be added, however, that "real measures" are also ideal.
On the law of sublation, we have been in the realm of the ideal ever since True Infinity arrived
upon the scene. As for "natural units" in chemistry, Butler has in mind atoms—a dangerous
claim, since Hegel was vociferously anti-atomic, even in chemistry. See infra text accompanying
note 250.
'22 " Bestimmungen materieller Existenzen sind." [1:358]. Hegel finished the first chapter of
Measure by defining materiality as "qualitative nature and subsistence." (347) ("qualitative Natur
und Bestehen") [1:358].
Space and time are not now divorced from these considerations. They are still moments,
"but their relationship no longer depends simply on their own nature because they are now
subordinated to further determinations." (348) ("die aber nun, weitem Bestimmungen
untergeordnet, nicht mehr nur nach ihrer eigenen Begriffsbestimmung sich zueinander
verhalten"). Hegel gives the example of soimd. In sound, there is the time in which vibrations
occur and the spatial element of the length and thickness of the thing that vibrates. Any
magnitude these considerations enjoy is determined externally. That is, fortune's finger must
sound a stop on the pipe if we are to hear a note of music.
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thing which is related to others." (348)i" The Real Measure specifies
these others as well as being specified by them.'^'^ These Specifying
Measures are in turn specified, and so an entire infinite series of
Measures is always invoked. "[S]pecific self-subsistence does Mt
continue as a single direct relation but passes over into a specific
determinateness which is a series of measures." (348)'"
A direct relation nevertheless exists. These unique, exclusive
measures are "Elective Affinities," which will be discussed later.
When opposing Measures are each viewed as Elective Affinities, each
Measure can sustain a certain amount of quantitative change without
undergoing qualitative change. But eventually, qualitative change
ensues Hegel calls this face-off of quantitative properties, as limited by
qualitative change, the Nodal Line. The Nodal Line yields the
Measureless and "the infinity of measure. In this, the self-exclusive and
self-subsistent measures are one with each other." (349)'" In other
words. Measure escapes its servitude to externality, "and the selfsubsistent measure enters into a negative relation with itself. (349) ^

' "fElin selfstandiges MaE einer Korperlichkeit, das sich zu andem verhalt." [1:359]. Ulrich
173
Ruschig complains that the materiality to which Real Measure is applied is simply assumed sub
silentio, neither derived nor derivable from prior categones, such as Pure Being. Ruschig snpra
note 168 at 7. But this overlooks the fact that Pure Being is material. See ERROL E. HARRIS
THE SPIRIT OF HEGEL 119 (1993) ("Being is the actual existing world as well as a logieal
category."). This material is rendered ideal at the end of Detrerminate Being. We now have
merely the thought of materiality to whieh the thought of Measure is applied. Not mere y
assumed, materiality is the residue of Pure Being and hence is derived To be sure, there is the
"givenness" of the beginning of the Logic, which Hegel concedes and carefully discusses.
David Gray Carlson, The Antepenultimacy of the Beginning in Hegel s Science of Logic (2003)
(unpublished manuscript). Ruschig means something different in his cnticism, which cannot be
judged as well taken.
• , j- . .
174 What makes the Measure "real"? Professor Butler suggests that the ehemicals dictate their
own proportions and therefore can be considered "natural units." BUTLER, j«pra note 62, at 113.
In physics, which involved inseparable time and space, there were no natural units. Since force
and other physical variables vary continuously in quantity, there is no objective unit of force.
Butler implies here that time or space are infinitely divisible, so that the unit of time—hour or
second—is conventionally chosen. Hegel did say in general, however, that space is an external,
real whole as sueh—hence amount—whereas time, like volume, is the ideal, negative factor, the
side of unitv " (342) ("auBerliches, reales Ganzes Uberhaupt, somit Anzahl, die Zeit hingegen, wie
das Volumen, ist das Ideelle, das Negative, die Seite der Einheit.") [1:352]. For clanfication, see
rwpra text accompanying notes 131-34.
u
175 "[D]ie spezifische Selbstandigkeit bleibt nicht in einem direkten Verhalmisse bestehen,
sondem geht in spezifische Bestimmtheit, die eine Reihe von MaBen ist, uber." [1:359].
176 Elective Affinity will stand for the neutral "third" Measure that two diverse Measures
produce when brought into juxtaposition. 5ee m/ra text accompanying notes 231-38.
177 "[D]ie Unendlichkeit des MaBes ein, in welcher die sich ausschlieBenden Selbstdndigkeite
Einsmiteinandersind." [1:359].
,, n
178 "[U]nd das Selbstandige in negative Beziehung zu sich selbst tntt. [l:Jsyj.
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The Relation of Self-Subsistent Measures

The Measures have become self-subsistent. This is a sign that
Quantity has recaptured its Quality. We are on the verge of checking
out from the transient hotel of Being altogether, in order to take up a
permanent self-subsistence in the realm of Essence, where "things"
endure over time.
Measures are actually relations of Measures, which are themselves
relations of Measures. They are "physical somethings" and "material
things." (349)'^' In this first section of Real Measure, the relation
undergoes three changes, (a) At first, the relation is immediate. It is
separate from its extremes (the Specifying Measmes). (b) These
separate Measures, however, are also quantitative, which means they
continue on into the relation which is their middle term, (c) The
quantitative aspect of these Measures represents the range of
quantitative change each Measure can undergo without suffering
qualitative change. Each Measure is a series facing another series in a
determinate way. Hegel calls this Elective Affinity. Here Measure's
indifferent willingness to be externally applied to other Measures
becomes exclusive to certain others and hence a qualitative Being-forself.
1.

Combination of Two Measures

The ensuing section on combination of measures is exceptionally
mysterious. It stands for the externality inherent in the idea of
combination. Thus, the measurer combines substances, which, like
school children at a cotillion, are indifferent to the choice of a partner.
In the preview just prior to this section, Hegel writes of the combined
measures that each is self-subsistent. Each "exists apart in particular
things and their combination is effected externally^ (349)'®° Hence, as
this section stands for the move of Understanding, we will draw Figure
20(a) as follows:

179 "[EJtwas, physikalische ... matierelle Dinge." [1:359].
180 "[BJestimmt sind, auBereinander an besondem Dingen bestehend, und werden aufierlich in
Verbindung gesetzt." [1:359-60].
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Figure 20(a)
Combination of Measures
I am interpreting the lesson here to be that, at first, Measure is
always a compound of other Measures. At this level, measure is
alienated from the true nature of the thing measured.
Hegel begins by reminding us that a thing is both a relation of
Measures and itself a Measure. As a Measure, it is a unity between
what is internal and what is extemal. Inwardness (or being-within-seip
is exemplified by weight, if weight is taken intensively. Meanwhile, if
the thing has multiple parts, this multiplicity is extensive—or "for
other."
The internal, intensive side is joined to an extemal appearance—
"the abstract, ideal element of space." (349)i8i The extemal appearance
is quantitatively determined (and space, it will be recalled, is Pure
Quantity itself).>^2
jhe relation of these extemal qualities—their
negative unity—"constitutes the qualitative nature of the material
something." (349-50)'This appears to mean that the measurer, who
joins the extemal qualities together in a quantitative way, puts them
together in a Measure, but a unity transcending the Measure constitutes
the tme quality of the thing. Hegel aims here, I think, at the negative
constitution of things that will be emphasized in the doctrine of
Essence.'^"*
181 "[D]as Abstrakte, Ideele, der Raum." [1:360].
182 See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2030-31.
183 "[M]acht die qualitative Natur des materiellen Etwas aus." [1:360].
184 Ulrich Ruschig draws a different conclusion. He thinks that Hegel is claiming that specific
weight (or density) is more "real" than the Ratio of Measures in Figure 19(c). Ruschig cnticizes
this position:
. .
Yet it is doubtful if the transition to the "real" and allegedly more intnnsic measure can
be regarded as a step in the logic of measuring without referring to a particular
material. It is also doubtful if there is a merely logical reason that the direct ratio of
mass and volume is the correct one for such a measuring.
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Specific gravity—the ratio between weight and volume—is given
as an example of Figure 20(a). Weight is portrayed as more authentic to
the thing than volume. As proof, Hegel points out that, when two
indifferent substances—say, gold and silver—are mixed together, the
weight of the combination is the sum of the two weights mixed with one
pound of gold and one pound of silver weighs two pounds.
This is not so with volume. Volume is spatial, and Hegel names
this the ideal aspect of the thing. Why ideal? It will be recalled that
ideality stands for reduction to thought. An ideality was thus defined at
the end of Determinate Being as, in effect, the mere memory of a
moment that has passed away through sublation.'®^
If we consider a physical object as constructed of molecules
whizzing about but somehow held together by Attraction in a shape—
this object is mostly space (or Repulsion) and very little "substance."^^®
The space infiised between the molecules of a thing cannot be
perceived. It is negative, and negative things are deduced, not
perceived. Space is simply a thought and hence ideal, not "real."
To prove that space is ideal, Hegel invokes again the admixture of
two indifferent substances. Perhaps if we add a pound of gold to a
pound of silver, we have an alloy that weighs two pounds. But if we
add a cup of gold to a cup of silver, we get less than two cups. The joint
volume of a compound may be less than the sum of the individual
substances. This is true because the substance is a mixture of material
and non-material—or empty and filled space. Hence, when liquid gold
is added to liquid silver, some of the silver atoms slip into the space that
pure gold would have preserved, so that the joint volume is less than the
sum of the individual volumes.'®^
Not only is space-volume taken as ideal, it is also to be taken as
Unit. Why is this so? Recall that, in the early career of Quantity, the
part of Number that was Amount and the part that was Unit were
arbitrarily designated by the mathematician. Apparently measurers
Ruschig, supra note 168, at 10. Ruschig suggests, to the contrary, that density fails to
characterize the complete truth of a substance. "[C]haracterization by external comparison turns
out to be superficial," he writes. Id. I think this is precisely Hegel's point. 1 don't think Hegel is
saying that density is closer to measuring the real thing than Rule was, which produced the Ratio
of Measures in Figure 19(c). Rather, in density (used by Hegel as a mere example of Real
Measure) an external force is necessary to accomplish the measuring, but there is some unique
quantity in the measured material which is truly essential to the thing. The thing is not totally
open to outside manipulation. Hegel is working on bringing out into the open this "measureless"
essence of the thing. He is not trying to measure the measureless, as Ruschig implies.
185 Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 546-48.
186 On Attraction and Repulsion (the constituent parts of Quantity), see Carlson, Quality,
supra note 9 at 569-84. Figures 10(a)-(c) in the appendix illustrate the relationship between
Attraction and Repulsion.
187 Later, Hegel will criticize such naive descriptions as 1 have provided for assuming the
existence of atoms without metaphysical proof. (360) I am imdoubtedly guilty as charged. My
point simply is that solid objects are made up mostly of empty space.
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have no such discretion accorded to them.
I think space's status as Unit reflects the negative constitution of
things. Hegel has just said that the negative unity of qualities composed
by the measurer was the qualitative nature of the thing. "Unit" stands
for Discreteness, content, being, etc. All these concepts tended to the
(negative) right side of the page early in Quantity. Now the thing is
conceived as Ratio—a negative unity of independent Measures. This
negativity is to be equated with space—and with the ideality of things in
general. Volume-space is therefore the "being" of the material thing. It
is to be taken as leaning to the (positive) left of the page. Thus, Hegel
remarks that "it is space itself which constitutes the subsistence of
matter in its external separated existence." (351)'^^
If volume is Unit because it is spatial, extensive, external, and
subjective, then weight (in specific gravity) is Amount. This is the
intensive aspect of the thing, "which manifests [the thing]
quantitatively." (350)'^^ For instance, a cubic inch of gold weighs 19.3
times as much as one cubic inch of water, when water is at its maximum
density at 4° C, and when the densities of both gold and water are
obtained by weighing the substances in air. Hence, we can say that for
every imit (i.e., cubic inch of water), gold manifests itself by the unique
amount of 19.3. Quantity is therefore intrinsic to the physical object.
Nevertheless, this Amount, although intrinsic, is negative, because
negativity is the constitution of all things. Gold is not inherently 19.3,
but is so only under very specified conditions to which gold itself is
indifferent. Hence, Amount leans to the right of the page.
Here we have no Ratio of Powers, however. Ratio of Powers stood
for the relation that is immune from manipulation of the mathematician.
So long as the exponent 16 stayed fixed in = 16, x determined itself
as {4,-4}.
This cannot be said of specific gravity. Nothing inherent in gold
requires its comparison to a cubic inch of water at 4° C. Hegel says of
Measures like specific gravity that
with the self-subsistence of the material thing immediacy has
retumed and in this the specific magnitude is an ordinary quantum
whose relation to the other side is likewise determined as the
ordinary exponent of a direct ratio. (350)'®"
Why has immediacy retumed? I think this means that the Measure
of the thing is a negative unity of diverse Measures brought together

188 "[D]er Raum selbst macht das Bestehen der auBereinanderseienden Materie aus." [1:362],
189 "[D]as in quantitativer Betimmtheit." [1:360],
190 "[D]a6 in der SelbstSndigkeit des Fursichsiens (materiellen Seins) die Unmittelbarkeit
zurUckgekehrt ist, an welcher die GrdBebestimmtheit ein QuanUim als solches, und das Verhaltnis
eines solchen zu der andem Seite ebenfalls in dem gewdhnlichen Exponenten eines direkten
Verhaltnisses bestimmt ist," [1:360],
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externally to define the thing. Of course, the Measures are diverse and
subjectively chosen, but the fact that the unity of them is the thing
suggests that the thing is immediate. That is, if the Measures are
stripped away and the mediating unity alone is considered, this unity is
an immediacy. Yet, in any such immediacy, the thing is at the mercy of
the measurer. For that reason, we do not have the Ratio of Powers
before us but highly manipulated quanta of the sort that we witnessed in
Direct Ratio.
The intrinsic Quantum of gold, to continue with that example, is an
"immediate quantum," (350)'^' and it is specific to the thing. But it is
likewise determined "only in the comparison with other exponents of
such ratios." (350)'92
fjgre Hegel apparently emphasizes the
conventionality of Measure. Earlier, Hegel remarked that it is "foolish
to speak of a natural standard of things." (334)'^^ Universal standards
of measure are merely conventional—"a matter of complete
indifference." (334)^^"^ Here, Hegel seems to be saying that specific
gravity is conventional, but it likewise captures the actual thing which
actually manifests itself quantitatively. Thus:
The exponent constitutes the specific intrinsic determinedness, the
inner characteristic measure of something; but because this its
measure rests on a quantum, it too is only an external, indifferent
determinateness. (350)'^^

Hence, gold's unique weight of 19.3 becomes something entirely
different if comparison of gold is to another metal (i.e., mercury) rather
than water at 4° C. Accordingly, the intrinsic magnitude of the thing is
alterable.
As the section heading indicates, specific gravity is "The
Combination of Two Measures" (349)'^^ A cubic inch of water at 4° C
(Unit) with the weight of 1 (Amount) is one Measure that faces off
against gold, the second Measure, which has the same Unit (cubic inch)
but a different Amount (19.3). In this encounter, "each of the two
measures, just because it is a measure, preserves itself in the alteration
which it ought to suffer through the externality of the quantum."
(350)'^'^ Thus, self-preservation is "an alteration of the measure itself

191 "[U]nmittelbares Quantum." [1:360].
192 "[I]st nur in der Vergleichimg mit andem Exponenten solcher Verhaltnisse bestimmt."
[1:360].
193 "Es ist daher toricht, von einem naturlichen MaBstabe der Dinge zu Sprechen." [1:344].
194 "[I]st es vollig gleichgiiltig." [1:344].
195 "Ej. macht das spezifische Ansichbestimmtsen, das innere eigentiimliche MaB von etwas
aus; aber indem dieses sein MaB auf dem Quantum beruht, ist es auch mn als auBerliche,
gleichgultige Bestimmtheit." [1:360-61].
196 "Verbindung zweier MaBe." [1:360].
197 "Einerseits erhalt sich nun jedes der beiden MaBe in der Veranderung, die an dasselbe
durch die AuBerlicbkeit des Quantums kommen solte, weil es MaB ist." [1:361].
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and nevertheless "a reciprocal specification." (350)>98 Yet, "this selfpreservation is itself a negative relation toward this quantum. (350)'^^
In other words, there is some quantitative aspect of gold which is not
19.3. Whatever this unnameable Quantity is, it is quite alienated from
19.3. Yet, this Quantity likewise specifies 19.3, when gold and water
are compared. Measure, then, is simultaneously a liar and a truth-teller
about things.
Hegel has not finished with weight and volume (the sides ot the
ratio known as specific gravity). If a substance were only quantitatively
determined, the admixture of two equal units of two different substances
should double their weight and volume. Weight is doubled but volume
is not.
,. •
f
That weight is doubled is evidence that weight is "a real being-torself and "fixed determinate being" of the substance. (351)2oo But even
weight's exponent is subject to alteration, since the exponent expresses
the qualitative aspect of the compound. Hegel has already said that the
qualitative aspect of material things is the unity of their external parts.
This appears to mean that the substance can undergo quantitative
change without undergoing qualitative change.
The quality of a
substance is therefore its indifference toward its outward quantitative
measure. Accordingly, Hegel writes, "The exponents, however, are
subject to alteration since they are the expression of the qualitative
aspect of the compound." (351)^^'
Weight, then, does not, after all, represent the immanent
determining of the quantitative element of the thing. Immanence is in
fact on display with regard to volume, even though the volume of the
compound is exempt from the rigor of addition. Its indifference to
addition suggests that volume is not the "real being-for-self'202 of the
substances.
Nevertheless, Being-for-self is precisely the nonimmanence of a thing's content.203 Volume represents immanence
because "it is space itself which constitutes the subsistence of matter in
its external separated existence." (351)2°'' jn other words, what subsists
in a Measure is its negativity to outward Measure—negative space.

198 "fEline Veranderung des Mafies selbst und zwar eine gegenseitige Spezifikation." [1:361].
199 "[AJndererseits aber ist dieses Sicherhalten selbst ein negatives Verhalten zu diesem
Quantum."
200 "mjiefursichseiendezumfestenDasein." [1:361].
201 "Aber in die Exponenten fallt die VerSnderung, indem sie der Ausdruck der qualitativen
Bestimmtheit, des Fursichseins als MaBverhaltnisse sind.". [1:361]. Hegel also says that weight is
"the number or amount of material parts," from the quantitative point of view. (351) ( [UJie
Menge der materiellen Telle." [1:361]). Perhaps this likewise means that the perceived number ot
pounds or grams that a substance yields is external to the thing that is being weighed.
202 See Figure 8(a).
203 Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 570-89.
.
„ r,.,£oi
204 "[D]er Raum selbst macht das Bestehen der auBereinanderseienden Matene aus. [1:362].
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Being negative, subsistence "lacks intrinsic being. (351)^1'^
Evidence of this is that the quantitative volume of the compound is
"subject to alteration." (351)2«^ The upshot of "this toanent
determining of the quantitative element" in volume is that "space is
posited as what it truly is, an ideal being." (351)2"^ That is, space is not
a real being but simply the thought of a past moment of the substance.
That it is merely an absence is why addition does not apply.
Volume and weight are the qualitative sides of material things.
Volume is inherently alterable, and so addition does not apply to it. But
even weight is alterable. Things on earth weigh something different
when they are transported to the moon. "[Mjeasure itself—and so too
the qualitative nature of the something based on it—has shown that it is
unstable in its own self." (351)2o« Measure "has its determmateness m
othermeasure relations." (351)209
The lesson to be drawn from "The Combination of Two
Measures," I think, is that all things have a Measureless aspect that
escapes merely external Measure. But Hegel does not wish to coiKcde
that there is an unknowable thing-in-itself in the mamer of Kant.
Measure says something true about the thing as well, which will be the
contribution of Dialectical Reason in the next section.
2.

Measure as a Series of Measure Relations

Metonymy is the theme of this new section's tongue. Metonymy is
the inability to name the thing directly—but only the context of the
thing. In metonymy, if the entire context is described, the unnameable
thing becomes a ghostly space the existence of which is simply inferred
from context.210 As Slavoj Zizek puts it:
The "oneness" of a thing is grounded not in its properties, but in the
negative synthesis of a pure 'One' which excludes (relates negatively
to) all positive properties: this "one" which guarantees the identity of
a thing does not reside in its properties, since it is ultimately its

205 "[i]st das nicht an sich Seiende." [1:362],

206 "fDlas Veranderliche." [1:362].

,

.

tj n

"

207 "[D]er Raum wird auf diese Weise als das, was er wahrhaft ist, als das Ideelle gesetzt.

208^ "[S]ondem das Mafi selbst und damit die darauf gegrundete qualitative Bestimmtheit.
[1:362].
, ,
u "
209 "fsieine Bestimmtheit in andem MaBverhaltnissen zu haben. [1.J62J.
210 See Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, in LAW
™
POSTMODERN MiND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE 157-65 (Peter
Goodrich & David Gray Carlson eds., 1998); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal
E^of Wealth MMation, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 687, 763 ("[I]n metonymy, the signified
always remains hidden, and negative. ).
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signifier?^'
In the current section, Hegel suggests that a thing is ultimately the
series of quanta produced when the thing is measured by all the other
things that surround it. The thing is therefore a vacant place that is
beyond direct, unmediated knowledge, but nevertheless indirectly
knowable. Although Hegel does not invoke the word metonymy, I
hazard the view that metonymy is now our theme. Figure 20(b)
becomes:

Figure 20(b)
Measure as a Series of Measure Relations
Shakespeare's Ulysses, in praise of degree, says: "Take but degree
away, untune that string. And, hark, what discord follows! each thing
meets In mere oppugnancy."^'^ HegeP'^ confirms this insight:
If two things forming a compound body owed their respective
specific natures only to a simple qualitative determination, they
would only destroy each other when combined. (351)^"*

It is the quantitative element that permits a thing to survive
combination. The quantitative element is therefore key to selfsubSIstciic6
Yet, self-subsistence is immanent to the thing. Therefore, selfsubsistence requires that the thing be combinable with another thing.
That is, the one Measure is affected quantitatively by the other Measure
and yet remains what it is qualitatively. In addition, its quantitative
manifestation is unique to the thing. Hence, Hegel writes, the thing's
"quality is masked in the quantitative element and is thus also
indifferent towards the other measure, continuing itself in it and in the
newly formed measure." (352)2i5 The thing, then, both contributes to
211 SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE FRAGILE ABSOLUTE—OR, WHY IS THE CHRISTIAN LEGACY WORTH
FIGHTING FOR? 51-52 (2000).
212 SHAKESPEARE,
note 132, act 1, sc. 3.
213 An ardent admirer of Shakespeare, incidentally. WALTER KAUFMANN, HEGEL: A
REINTERPRETATION 253 (1978); T.M. Knox, The Puzzle of HegeVs Aesthetics m ART AND
LOGIC IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY 1, 4 (Warren Steinkraus & Kenneth 1. Schmitz eds.,
see HORST ALTHAUS, HEGEL: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 210 (Michael Tarsh trans., 2000)
(Hegel thought Shakespeare was artistically confused).

214 "Wenn etwas, das mit anderm vereint wird, und ebenso dies Andere, nur durch die "nfache
Qualitat bestimmt, das ware, was es ist, so wurden sie in dieser Verbindung nur sich aufheben.
215 "Seine Qualitat ist eingehullt in das Quantitative; damit ist sie ebenso gleichgultig gegen
das andere MaB, kontinuiert sich in dasselbe und in das neue gebildete MaB hinein." [1:362].
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and escapes detection of its Measure.
Hegel writes of a Specified Measure being taken by a measurer
who imposes yet another (Specifying) Measure on it. The result is a
predictable Quantum which is nevertheless external to the "true"
Measureless thing.
The exponent of the new measure is itself only some quantum or
other, an extemal determinateness, and its indifference finds
expression in the fact that the specifically determined thing effects,
in association with other such measures, precisely similar
neutralizations of the reciprocal measure relations. (352)216

Here, Hegel is denying that Measure is an arbitrary Quantum, as Figure
20(a) insisted. Rather, it contributes to a unique middle term between
the two Measures which nevertheless fails to express the true being of
the Specified Measure completely.^i'
Hegel in this section emphasizes that it takes two sub-Measures to
produce a third externally observable Measure. Yet, neither constitutive
sub-Measure is entirely reflected in the observable third Measure.
Nevertheless, the observed Quantum is a true statement of the Ratio of
Measures.218 And, further, every Measure has a series of unique quanta
that relates it to any given Measure the measurer cares to bring forth.
A Series of Measures defines a thing's relation to other Measures;
"This combination with a number of others which are likewise measures
within themselves, yields different ratios which therefore have different
exponents." (352)21^ Only when a self-subsistent Measure is compared
to some other Measure does its unique exponent make itself apparent.
216 "[D]er Exponent des neuen MaBes ist selbst nur irgendein Quantum, aufierliche
Bestimmtheit, stellt sich als Gleichgiiltigkeit darin dar, daC das spezifisch bestimmte Etwas mit
andem ebensolchen Mafien ebendergleichen Neutralisierungen der beiderseitigen
MaCverhaltnisse eingeht." [1:362],
212 There is a mysterious sentence in the Miller translation that is more elearly expressed in the
Johnson-Struthers translation. Immediately after the most recent quote in the text, the Miller
translation states: "[I]t is only one measure relation formed by itself and another specifieally
determined thing that its specifie peculiarity is not expressed." (352) Johnston and Struthers put
it this way: the "specific peculiarity [of a thing] fails to express itself when it and another form
One only." 1 HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 371 (W.H. Johnston & E.G. Struthers trans., 1929)
("in nur Einem, von ihm und einem andem Gebildeten driickt sich seine spezifische
Eigentumlichkeit nicht aus" [1:362]).
218 The truth, of course, is merely one-sided. Nevertheless, as Andrew Haas points out, "being
is a result of measurement; that is, 'to be' means 'to already have a measure'—for being is merely
an abstraction from concrete measurement, or a reduction and fixing of immeasurable
singularity." ANDREW HAAS, HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLICITY 139(2000). In short,
things are only to the extent they are measured by consciousness.
It does not follow, however, as Ulrich Rusehig suggests, that "the quality of a substance
can be characterized more precisely by comparing its initial density with the densities of its
combinations with substances." Rusehig, supra note 168, at 11. Hegel is not aiming to define
precise measurement. Rather, he is trying to show that, no matter how precise the measurement,
there is a measureless aspect of a thing that escapes.
219 "Diese Verbindung mit Mehrem, die gleichfalls MaBe an ihnen sind, gibt verschiedene
Verhaltnisse, die also vershiedene Exponenten haben." [1:362-63].
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This exponent, however, is a "neutrality," not a direct expression of the
real exponent. The thing (or its qualitative exponent) is, in effect, a
series of neutral exponents. The qualitative exponent, Hegel says, is to
be taken as the Unit of the series—its true qualitative being.
Hegel warns against a misimpression: a self-subsistent Specified
Measure (x) forms a series of exponents with a series of other Measures.
Suppose this series is defined as X, with members X^j. Now imagine
one of the Specifying Measures (y), which contributes one exponent
(Xxy) to the set of X. The misimpression is that, just as X defines the
Specified Measure (x), X also defines the Specifying Measure (y). This
is not so, Hegel says. Rather, y has a series Y such that Y^y = X^. x and
y have Yxy = X^y in common. "It is this alone ... which makes it
possible to compare the two self-subsistent measures." (353)^20
Furthermore, Hegel continues, as Specified Measure, x, is Unit and
the series X (including Xfy) is amount. But from y's perspective as
Specified Measure, y is Unit and the series
is Amount. Furthermore,
X and Y are each to be considered Units in and of themselves. Hence, x
and y are "Amounts" in the Units X and Y.
If the series X, for instance, is a Unit, then X itself refers to some
other series X'xj, which is Amount to X-as-Unit but likewise Unit to
some further Amount. Hence, there is an infinite regress—a Spurious
Infinity—in "Measure as a Series of Measure Relations." As we are in
a dialectic mode, we see our traditional undecidability between the
extremes of Unit and Amount and also within each of the extremes in
Figure 20(b).
In this infinite regress, Hegel sees a return to Degree. The
Specified Measure and also the series it generates are "simple or
unitary." (354)^21 But, just as the 100th Degree was defined by the
Extensive Magnitude outside it (1-99, 101-infinity), so the Specified
Measure, as Unit, is defined by all the Measures outside such a
Specified Measure. The Unit is surrounded by "a circle of quanta,"
(354)222 and each quantum is itself surrounded by a circle of quanta. In
other words, the Specified Measure is a metonym. It cannot be known
directly, but only by what it is not. Within these wheels-within-wheels
"the self-determinedness of measure lies." (354)223
220 "In ihr also liegt allein die Vergleichbarkeit der beiden Selbstandigen, die als sich nicht
miteinander neutralisierend, sondem als gleichgOltig gegeneinander angenommen wurden."
[1:363-64],
221 "[Ejinfach zu sein." [1:364].
222 "Kreis von Quantis." [1:364],
223 "[W]orin das Fursichbestimmtsein des MaBes liegt." [1:364]. In effect, I have intetpreted
"Combination of Two Measures" as standing for the indifference of Specified to Specifying
Measure, whereas "Measure as a Series of Measure Relations" stands for the dependence of a
thing on Measure in general. The middle term will stand for the unity of indifference and
dependence of things to their Measure. In contrast, Ruschig thinks that "Combination of Two
Measures" stands for density of unchanged substances, while "Measure as a Series" stands for
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Of these metonyms, Hegel writes, "Its self-relation is in the first
place an immediate relation and therefore its indifference to an other
consists only in the quantum." (354)^^"^ In other words, the quality of
the thing is quantitative. Like a Quantity, its content is supplied by the
circle of Measures that surrounds it. Nevertheless, Measure as Series is
too advanced to be simply a Quantity indifferent to its own integrity;
But this relation in which two specific measures specify themselves
in a third something, the exponent, also implies that the one has not
passed into the other; that therefore there is not only one negation,
but that both are posited as negative in the relation. (354)225
The Specified Measure, being a True Infinite, stays what it is even
as it yields an appearance—the series that it generates.226 In this guise,
the Specified Measure announees, "I am not any one of the quanta in
the series." Yet, the Specifying Measure which generates the quantum
in the Series is saying the same thing. It likewise says, "Neither am I
the quantum in the Series that the Specified Measure generated."
At this point. Speculative Reason intervenes to point out that each
of the Measures—[1] and [3]—claims not to be the Series [2]. Yet, [2]
is authentically each of the Measures. Hence, [1] and [3] have
something in common. This commonality Hegel names Elective
Affinity.

Figure 20(c)
Elective Affinity
Of Figure 20(c), Hegel writes: "This their qualitative unity [2, 4] is

neutralized (hence changed) substances. "Only if we refer to the chemical content, the logical
transition is comprehensible as well as conclusive." Ruschig, supra note 168, at 7. Obviously, I
disagree. Hegel is aiming for the metaphysics of Measure, for which density and stoichiometry
are simply examples. Hegel may shift from examples pertaining to density to examples
pertaining to stoichiometry, but this does not affect the integrity of his logic.
224 "Seine Beziehung auf sich ist zunachst als unmittelbares Verhaltnis, und damit besteht
sogleich seine Gleichgultigkeit gegen Anderes nur in dem Quantum." [1:365].
225 "Aber diese Beziehung, in welcher sich zwei Spezifische zu etwas, zu einem Dritten, dem
Exponenten, spezifieren, enthalt femer dies, dafi das eine darin nicht in das andere ubergegangen,
also nicht nur eine Negation uberhaupt, sondem beide darin negativ gesetzt sind." [1:365].
226 Enduring externality is this very feature that separates ordinary chemistry, which is a theme
of Measure, from the super-advanced category of Chemism at the end of the Logic. See John W.
Burbidge, Chemistry and Hegel's Logic, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 609-11.
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thus a self-subsistent exclusive unit [7]." (354)22?
YT\, which Hegel
calls "the neutral relationship,"22^ proves that the exponents in the
Series have a qualitative nature, reflecting the truth of the thing.
Obviously, [7] is a Measure; Measure is quantitative as well as
qualitative, and so [7] reflects that the difference between [1] and [3] is
quantitative. Of this quantitative basis, Hegel says that the selfsubsistent Measure—^[1] or [3]—is indifferent to [7]. This indifference
is the very quantitative basis that permits [1] or [3] to go outside itself
and into [7].
To summarize, then, [1,2] and [2, 3] turned out to be the opposite
of what they were supposed to be. The extremes renounced this middle
term and held themselves aloof. But these extremes likewise have an
affinity, because, without its other. Specified Measure could not
manifest what it is.
Although Hegel is very "chemical" in his discussion, his comments
apply to love.229 A human being stands aloof from others but only
manifests herself in the world in the eyes of others. Human personality
is very much a Measure, which is why people alternate rivalry and
aloofness with great affinity towards their true Measure.220
3.

Elective Affinity

Affinity and neutrality refer to chemical relationships.221 "For a
chemical substance has its specific determinateness essentially in its
relation to its other and exists only as this difference from it." (355)222
In other words, a substance is metonymic. It is nothing but a series of
Measures, none of which captures the reality of the stuff.
Accordingly, Affinity, as introduced in the last section, was not
just affinity to some other substance but generally to the entire series of
227 "Diese ihre qualitative Einheit ist somit fur sich seiende ausschlieCende Einheit." [1:365].
228 "[N]eutrale Beziehung." [1:365]. This will relate to chemical reactions in the next section.
Thus, acids and alkali are mutually attractive, and their relation is "neutral" and "stoichiometric."
See infra text accompanying notes 261-83.
729 The connection between Elective Affinity and love was not lost on the Greeks.
"Empedocles was of the opinion that the particles of the four elements—earth water, air, and fire,
passed to and from one another by means of love and hatred." Cees de Pater, Newton and
Eighteenth-Century Conceptions of Chemical Affinity, in HEGEL AND NEAVTONIANISM, supra
note 4, at 619.
230 I give this concept a more rigorous treatment in David Gray Carlson, How to Do Things
With Hegel, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1377 (2000).
221 Goethe, Hegel's patron, also had a popular novel in 1809 entitled The Elective Affinities.
See JoHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, ELECTIVE AFFINITIES (R.J. Hllingdale trans., 1971). For
a review, see H.A.M. Snelders, The Significance of Hegel's Treatment of Chemical Affinity, in
HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 631.
232 "Denn in der chemischen Sphdre hat wesentlich das Materielle seine spezifische
Bestimmtheit in der Beziehung auf sein Anderes; es existiert nur als diese Differenz." [1:365].
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all substances.233
series was nothing but the common quanta that
the Specified Measure holds with each and every other Measure.
Hence, the Specified Measure was indifferent amongst the many
Measures to which it is compared. Simultaneously, each member of the
series was itself an exclusive Measure between the Specified and
Specifying Measure.^^'^
Elective affinity (Wahlverwandtschaff), however, singles out these
exclusive Measures and proclaims some "better" than (or at least
qualitatively different from) some of the others. "In elective affinity as
an exclusive, qualitative correlation [7]," Hegel writes, "the relationship
is rid of [its] quantitative difference." (355)235 In this series of exclusive
relations, numbers have lost their continuity with each other. These
relations are therefore qualitative (yet not entirely qualitative).
How does Hegel derive this qualitative preference for one Measure
over another? The derivation has to do with the ''extensive magnitude
of the substances" in the series of Measures that define the metonymic
thing. (355)236 Extensive Magnitude, it will be recalled, stood over
against Degree. If Degree was, for instance, the 100th degree.
Extensive Magnitude stood for 1-99 and 101 through infinity—^the
external numbers implicitly excluded by the 100th degree and by which
Degree is defined. But Extensive Magnitude and Degree ended up
being the same thing. The 100th Degree had its Extensive Magnitude
within it as well as without it. That followed because Degree was a
True Infinite. All this was established in Figure 14(c) (the Quality of
the Quantum).23'!'
Intensity suggests that, of the series of neutralizing Measures that
define the metonymic Specified Measure, the opposing Measures can be
arranged according to the intensity with which they "neutralize" the
Specified Measure. The Specifying Measures therefore differ in the
quantity needed to neutralize, and this ends up being the very quality of
the Specified Measure.
The relation of a unique Specifying and Specified Measure is
233 Hegel will later say that the Elective Affinities identify "a self-subsistent measure [that]
relates itself to self-subsistent measures of a different quality and to a series as such." (367) ("ein
Selbstandiges sich zu Selbstandigen anderer Qualitat und zu einer Reihe solcher verhalt,
verschieden." [1:380]).
234 Elective Affinity applies not only to chemistry but to music. Each musical note has
meaning only in combination with the series of notes. The circle of notes is the composition
itself. Any given note belongs to that composition but is likewise a "member in the system of
every other key." (355). ("Glied im Systeme jedes andem Grundtons" [1:366]). The composition
and the harmonies within it are Elective Affinity. The character of the composition, however, is
dissolved if the "merely quantitative progression" (355) ("bloB quantitativen Fortgehens" [1:366])
is exalted over the qualitative "group being" of the whole.
235 "In der Wahlverwandtschafl als ausschlieBender, qualitativer Beziehung entnimmt das
Verhalten sich diesem quantitativen Unterschiede." [1:366].
236 "[£)]er extensiven GroBe, der unter den Gliedem." [1:366].
237 Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2072.
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exclusive and hence qualitative. Now the thing graduates to the
relationship ... of more or less." (356)^^^ But there is still a sense in
which the Specified Measure is indifferent whether it is neutralized by
one rather than another Specifying Measure (even though the quantity
necessary to neutralize differs). The qualitative relation of Elective
Affinity is therefore still external and hence quantitative.
a.

Remark: Berthollet on Chemical Affinity and Berzelius's Theory
ofit239

Hegel now commences a long comment on theories of affinity
from chemistry.240 As with his calculus commentaries,^^! ^^e fault he
finds is that chemistry indaequately distinguishes Quantity and Quality.
Certain chemical substances are attracted more strongly to certain
substances than to others. This is evidence that the substance is
incomplete. Such substances "strictly speaking do not exist for
themselves but only as a tendency to get rid of their isolatedness by
combining with another constituent." (357)242
Such chemical
substances have a "quantitative mode of... relationship" (357)243
which determines how much of one substance is needed to neutralize
another. This quantitative aspect identifies the qualitative aspect of the
substance. "[I]t makes it what it is on its own account and the number
which expresses this is essentially one of several exponents" that could
have been cited. (357)244 Sm;h substances have a measurable affinity
for each other.
The quantitative nature of these substances is what allows them to
coexist. If their connection had been purely qualitative (as is the case of
positive and negative electrical charges), the one side would be nothing
but the negative of the other. The two sides could not then exhibit any
indifference to or self-subsistence apart from the other. The quantitative
aspect allows one substance to neutralize more than one other
substance. Thus, an acid will neutralize many different alkali. In fact,
one difference between acids is the quantity needed to neutralize a given
238 "[D]as Mehr oder Weniger." [1:367],
239 -iTiis Remark was added in the 1831 revision of the Science of Logic. BURBIDGE, REAL
PROCESS, IWPRA note 12, at 65.
240 Aecording to one commentary, for Hegel, "elective affinity is the cause of the origin of
chemical substances." H.A.M. Snelders, The Significance of Hegel's Treatment of Chemical
Affinity, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 631, 637.
241 See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2093-2138.
242 "[E]igentlich nieht fur sich existieren, sondem nur diese Existenz haben, ihr isoliertes
Bestehen aufzuheben und sich mit einem andem zu verbinden." [1:368].
243 "[D]er quantitativen Art und Weise des Verhaltens." [1:368].
244 "[S]ie macht ihn zu dem, was er fiir sich ist, und die Zahl, die dies ausdruckt, ist wesentlich
einer von mehrem Exponenten." [1:368].

2003]

HEGEL ' S THEORY OF MEASURE

175

alkali. If comparatively little of an acid is needed for the task, then we
say that acid has a closer affinity than another which requires more.
That acids can neutralize many alkali is proof that the acids have selfsubsistence, which is founded on the quantitative side of Measure.245
Hegel considers various discoveries of chemistry. Thus, "if two
neutral solutions are mixed resulting in dissociation followed by two
new compounds, these products, too, are neutral." (357-58)246 Another
law, which is supposed to "follow" from the one just stated is this; if it
takes twice as much Alkali A to neutralize Acid A as it takes Alkali B to
neutralize Acid A, then, this ratio of two-to-one will hold for Acid B.247
Claude Louis Berthollet, a generation older than Hegel, worked on
laws such as these; he had a theory of "chemical mass,"(358)248 which
Hegel criticizes for eliminating the qualitative moment of exclusive
elective affinity. A contemporary textbook in chemistry by Jons Jakob,
Baron von Berzelius,249 is immortalized for its uncritical acceptance of
Berthollet's theory, and for assuming the existence of atoms. In
analyzing saturation, what matters is not atoms but comparative
quantities. If there is to be any talk of atoms, then the existence of
atoms must be proved, or at least corroborated, by metaphysics, "but
this cannot confirm them any more than experience can—on the
contrary!"(360)26o
245 Why quantitative, when, in general, self-subsistence has been associated with the
qualitative aspect? In the previous section, Hegel emphasized that the enduring feature of a
thing—what exceeds the infinite set of measures—is its negativity. This negativity is quantitative.
246 "[W]enn zwei neutrale Solutionen gemischt werden, wodurch eine Scheidung und daraus
zwei neue verbindungen entstehen, diese Produkte gleichfalls neutral sind." [1:369]. This theory
was discovered in 1792 by Jeremias Benjamin Richter. Snelders, supra note 238, at 639.
247 See Ruschig, supra note 168, at 7. Hegel credits a Berlin colleague, Ernst Gottfried
Fischer, for this discovery. (358).
248 "[Cjhemischen Masse." [1:370]. Berthollet also favored "phlogiston" over Lavoisier's
oxygen. Dietrich Von Engelhardt, Hegel on Chemistry and the Organic Sciences, in HEGEL AND
NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 657.
249 Berzelius was a Swedish chemist nine years Hegel's junior. Snelders, supra note 231, at
640.
250 "[A]ber warden sie so wnig als durch der Ehrfuhrung bestatigt,—im Gegenteil!" [1:372].
Hegel was a harsh critic of atomism in both natural and ethical philosophy. See Carlson, Quality,
supra note 9, at 564-66. In chemistry, Hegel, in the Philosophy of Nature, protests that atoms, as
self-identities, are inconsistent with continuity, which will be emphasized in Figure 21(a).
Burbidge, supra note 231, at 609. According to Burbidge:
Although [atomism] certainly reduces chemical bodies into elements and distinguishes
elements according to their atomic weight, it leaves the chemical process
unexplained .. . The theory has moved from a sense of totality to its discrete moments,
but it does not reconstitute the totality with which it began. It is, therefore, incomplete.
Id. at 614; see also BURBIDGE, REAL PROCESS, supra note 12, at 71 (once atoms were seen as
"minute fields of energy .. . they ceased to be atoms in the traditional sense of indivisible spheres
of matter, and fitted more closely to the Hegelian perspective in which relations are as important
as distinctions"). Hegel's contemporary, John Dalton, would produce a chemical theory
involving atoms that was much different from the eighteenth century atomism that Hegel was
criticizing. Wolfgang Bonispien, Newtonian Atomism and Eighteenth-Century Chemistry, in
HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 595, 599, 608. Nevertheless, Birbidge comments
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The fault of the chemists that Hegel criticizes is that elective
affinity, which is qualitative, is reduced to quantitative difference.
Meanwhile, when exclusive Elective Affinities are observed, these are
ascribed to circumstance—"to determinations which appear as
something external to the affinity." (361)^^'
Chemical affinity has been distinguished from Elective Affinity.
The latter is qualitative "whose behavior in no way coincides with the
order of that series." (362)252 a confusion, however, arises with regard
to electrical action and chemical action. Hegel chooses not to dwell on
the matter because this confusion is not relevant to Measure as such.252
Nevertheless the confusion "must be dubbed shallow, for shallowness
consists in omitting the difference between distinct terms and then
treating them as identical." (362)25^ Hegel pronounces Berzelius s
equation of the two "almost comical." (362)255 jj, this description,
electricity is said to be the cause of chemical action, "but about the
that Hegel's "conceptual problem with atomism ... blinded [him] to the way the simple
progression of determinate propositions justified the belief in basic chemical units." BURBIDGE,
REAL PROCESS, JMPRA, at 71.
251 "[A]uf Bestimmungen, welche als etwas der Verwandtschaft AuBerliches. [1.373]. A
comparison is made between the quantification of Elective Affinities and the analysis of
pendulums. Gravity causes the pendulum to pass into a state of rest. But this is treated as caused
by air resistance rather than gravity—again an external or circumstantial attribution. (362) The
point here, according to one commentator, is that one should abstract from those physical factors
with an ancillary effect on the motion of the pendulum and consider the pendulum as a
mechanism directly dependent on gravity. Michael John Petry, Classifying the Motion: Hegel on
the Pendulum, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 291, 311.
252 "[D]eren Verhalten mit jener Ordnung keineswegs zusammenffillt." [1;374].
253 Hegel has already said that positive and negative electrical charges are purely qualitative,
whereas chemical attraction is qualitative and quantitative—a Measure. For this reason, electrical
charges have no subsistence in the absence of its opposite, but chemicals do. (357-58). Only after
1800 are "the so-called imponderable substances—light, heat, magnetism and electricity...
dropped from chemistry." Engelhart, 5upra note 248, at 657.
254 "F(ir sich selbst ist sie seicht zu nennen, weil die Seichtigkeit dann besteht, das
Verschiedene mit Weglassung der Verschiedenheit identisch zu nehmen." [1:374].
255 "[B]einahe komisch." [1:374]. Hegel pauses to denounce the practice of deferring to the
great prestige of scientists as a reason not to subject their theories to criticism:
The merit and fame which Berzelius has eamed by his theory of proportions, which
has been extended to all chemical relations, ought not as such to be made a reason for
not setting forth the weaknesses of this theory; but a more particular reason for doing
so must be the circumstance that such merit in one aspect of a science, as with Newton,
tends to become an authority for a baseless structure of spurious categories which is
attached to it and that it is just this kind of metaphysics which is proclaimed and
echoed too with the greatest pretension. (365).
Das Verdienst und der Ruhm von Berzelius wegen der auf alle chemischen
Verhaltnisse ausgedehnten Proportionenlehre dttrfte fur sich kein Abhaltungsgrund
sein, die BloBe der angefuhrten Theorie auseinanderzusetzen; ein ndherer Grund aber,
dies' zu tun, muB der Umstand sein, daB solches Verdienst in einer Seite der
Wissenschaft, wie bei Netwon, Autoritat fur ein damit in Zusammenhang gesetztes
grundloses Gebaude von schlechten Kategorien zu werden pflegt, und daB gerade
solche Metaphysik dasjenige ist, was mit der groBten Pratension ausgegeben und
ebenso nachgesprochen wird.
[1:377].
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specifically chemical nature of the chemical process electricity tells us
nothing." (363)^56 Hegel's basic assessment of the confusion is that
electricity "is transient and remains external to the quality of
substances." (363)25^ Chemical action "embraces and alters the entire
qualitative nature of substances." (363)^^^
Chemicals have affinities, but, as Real Measures, they also have an
independent existence. Certain Measures, however, "are inseparable
and cannot be displayed in a separate and distinct existence of their
own." (365)259 In specific gravity, weight and volume cannot be
separated. To be sure, specific gravity involves external comparison—
of some chemical to a cubic inch of water at 4° C. Hegel proposes,
however, the project of finding the series of specific gravities of one
substance against, not just water, but all the other substances.^^o
B.

Nodal Line of Measure-Relations

In Elective Affinity (or neutrality), the exclusive and hence
qualitative nature of the Specified Measure's relation to a Specifying
Measure was emphasized. Yet, the Specified Measure had a series of
Elective Affinities.
How shall these separate moments be
distinguished? They can be distinguished only quantitatively.^^! jhe
amounts needed to neutralize the Specified Measure vary between the
Elective Affinities.
Because Elective Affinity (or neutrality) is quantitative, affinity
continues into the other neutralities. Hence, we have;

256 "[D]a6 die Elektrizitat die Ursache des chemischen Verhaltens sei, dafi aber die Elektrizitat
uber das, was im chemischen Prozesse chemisch ist, keinen AufschluB gebe." [1:375].
257 "[F]luchtig ist und der Qualitat der Korper auBerlich bleibt." [1:375],
258 "[D]ie ganze qualitative Natur der Korper in Anspruch nimmt und alteriert." [1:375].
259 "[U]ntrennbar sind und nicht in einer eigenen, voneinander verschiedenen Existenz
dargestellt werden kdnnen." [1:378].
260 "The problem would be to recognize the exponents of the ratios of the series of specific
gravities as a system based on a rule which would specify a merely arithmetical plurality into a
series of harmonic nodes." (365) ("Es wdre die Aufgabe vorhanden, die Verhaltnisexponenten der
Reihe der spezifischen Schweren als ein System aus einer Kegel zu erkennen, welche cine bloB
arithmetische Vielheit zu einer Reihe harmonischer Knoten spezifizierte." [1:378]). Burbidge
claims that these remarks look forward to Dimitri Mendeleev's periodic table later in the
nineteenth century. BURBIDGE, REAL PROCESS, supra note 12, at 72.
261 Hence, eighteenth century chemistry made tables of Elective Affinities a major research
project. Snelders, supra note 238, at 640.
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Figure 21(a)
Continuity of Affinity
Thus, to the extent we can arrange the Affinities quantitatively, this
arrangement is externally imposed on them. Yet, externality "in the
form of a comparison"(366)2^2 is not their only moment. Neutrality is
''separable into the moments which united to produce it." (366)2^3
Affinity may be continuous, but "it is as self-subsistent somethings that
these [two Measures] enter into relation indifferently with one or the
other of the opposite series, although combining in different,
specifically determined amounts." (366-67)2^4
Hence, says Dialectical Reason, not only is Affinity continuous,
but it is "infected with its own indifference; it is in its own self
something external and alterable in its relation to itself." (367)2^^ \Ye
thus have a unity of Continuity and Indifference.

Figure 21(b)
Indifference of Affinity
(Substrate)
262 "[A]ls eine Vergleichung." [1:379].
263 "[A]ls solche eine Trennbarkeit in ihr." [1:379].
264 "[A]Is selbstandige Etwas, jedes als gleichgultig, mit diesem oder mit andem der
gegenilberstehenden Reihe, obzwar in verschiedenen spezifisch bestimmten Mengen sich zu
verbinden, in Beziehung treten." [1:379].
265 "[i]n ihm selbst beruht, mit eigner Gleichgiiltigkeit behaftet; es ist ein an ihm selbst
Aufierliches und in seiner Beziehung auf sich ein Veranderliches." [1:379].
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Indifference represents the "relation to itself of the measure
relation." (367)2^6 As such, it is qualitative, and it is important to note
that this self-relation begins to appear at this stage on the right {i.e.,
negative) side of the page. This was already implicit when Measure as
Series was placed on the right side. Measure as Series was likewise
implicitly a metonym—an indifference to any given Measure but
nevertheless the sum total of them all. Now we have an indifference to
Measure that is posited, or, as Hegel says "affirmatively present."
(367)26^ Furthermore, what is posited is what Being is not. This will be
the quintessential character of Essence, which technically exceeds the
scope of Measure but is already beginning to show itself here.^®^
This indifference is given an important new name. Hegel calls
Indifference "a permanent, material substrate." (367)^®' The Substrate
is a qualitative continuity, even as the outward appearance of a
substance changes. To borrow one of Hegel's favorite examples,^''''
water becomes ice if its quantitative temperature falls too low, and it
becomes steam if the temperature becomes too high. But, in all these
quantitatively different states, it remains H2O. H2O may be considered
the Substrate of all the various appearances of water in its liquid, solid
or gaseous forms.
The Substrate, however, is not unconnected with its Measure. It is
"continuous" with it, as Figure 21(b) indicates. The Substrate "must
contain in its quality the principle of the specification of this
externality" in a Measure. (367)2'^'
We are now in the dialectical mode, so we may expect that each of
the extremes—[1] and [3]—denies [2] and thereby confirms [2] as its
true being.272 Hegel confirms this:
[T]he exclusive measure [1] as thus more precisely determined is
external to itself in its being-for-self [2] and hence repels itself from
itself, positing itself both as another measure relation and also as
another, merely quantitative, relation; it is determined as in itself [2]
a specifying unity which produces measure relations within itself.
(367)2"

266 "Die Beziehung des Verhaltnismafles auf sich." [1:379].
267 "[SJeiende." [1:379],
268 In Essence, I will change our convention. In the realm of Being, the Understanding dragged
the middle term over to the left the page—the side of being. But in the realm of Essence, the
Understanding will drag the middle term over to the right—the side of Nothing. Reflection
always signals what a thing is not (thereby showing what it is).
269 "[B]leibendes, materielles Substrat." [1:379].
270 LESSER LOGIC, supra note 6, § 140 Remark.
271 "[l]n seiner Qualitat jenes Prinzip der Spezifikation diese AuBerlichkeit enthalten miifite."
[1:379].
272 See HAAS, supra note 216, at 155 (Measure "shows itself as the between of that which it
seeks to exclude").
273 "Das ausschlieflende MaB nach dieser nahem Bestimmung nun, in seinem Fiirsichsein sich
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This isolation of [2] as the essence of the extremes is our typical
move of Speculative Reason. We therefore have:

Figure 21(c)
Nodal Line
Figure 21(c) differs from Elective Affinity. The Elective Affinity
of Figure 20(c) identified "a self-subsistent measure relat[ing] itself to
self-subsistent measures of a different quality and to a series of such.
At that point, the concept of Substrate had not yet been
developed.2" NQW the series in Figure 21(c) is recognized as taking
place "in one and the same substrate within the same moments of the
neutrality." (367)^^6 Measure has become self-repelling, and it has
exiled its quantitative Measures to the extremes, from which it is merely
quantitatively different. The Substrate, then, organizes the series of
Measures into "a nodal line of measures on a scale of more and less."
(367)2"

The Substrate is a being-for-self, which needs external quanta to
express what it is. Because of this need, the Measure is "open to
externality and to quantitative alteration." (367)2" Furthermore, it has
inherited from the earlier stage of Rule the character that it has a range
within which it remains indifferent to [quantitative] alteration and does
not change its quality." (367)22^
auBerlich, stoBt sich von sich selbst ab, setzt sich sowohl als ein anderes, nur quantitatives, als
auch als ein seiches anderes Verhaitnis, das zugleich ein anderes MaB ist,—ist als an sich selbst
spezifizierende Einheit bestimmt, welche an ihr MaBverhaltnisse produziert. [E380].

274 "[E]in Selbstandiges sich zu Selbstandigen anderer Qualitat und zu einer Reihe solcher
verhalt, verschieden." [1:380]).
.
,
275 Bonispien, supra note 248, at 607 ("In his theory of elective affinity, [Hegel] seems to be
operating without any presupposed substances. Since there is no chemical substratam, simp y a
variety of chemical reactions, the chemical elements are regarded as being completely determined

by means oftheir mutual inter-relationships.").
276 "rA]n einem und demselben Substrate innerhalb derselben Momente der Neutralitat statt.
[1:380]. This justifies Andrew Haas's remark: "If'exclusion' marks the elective affinities of se sufficient measures, then 'inclusion' marks them when they take on the form of a knotted
l i n e . . . . " HAAS, S«PRA note 216, at 155.

„ r, TQAI

277 "[E]ine Knotenlinie von MaBen auf einer Skale des Mehr und Weniger. [1:380].
278 "[D]erAu6erlichkeit

und der Quantumsveranderungoffen." [1:380],

279 "[E]s hat eine Weite, innerhalb deren es gegen diese Veranderung gleichgultig bleibt und
seine Qualitat nicht andert." [1:380].
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Because Measure has a range of quantitative change that invokes
no qualitative change, "there enters a point in this quantitative alteration
at which the quality is changed and the quantum shows itself as
specifying, so that the altered quantitative relation is converted into a
measure, and thus into a new quality, a new something." (367)2^0
Quantitative change, then, leads to qualitative change.
Nevertheless, underneath the qualitative change lies an indifferent
Substrate. In qualitative change, the two qualities, Hegel says, have no
connection. One is not the limit to the other. Each is completely
external to the other. But a Substrate underlies all the changes. "The
new something has therefore not emerged from or developed out of its
predecessor but directly from itself." (367-68)2^i
decisive point is
that, "in this 'infinite progress' of a self-continuing nodal line one unity
remains nonetheless, one 'self-sameness' constitutes itself.
Meanwhile, the relation between the qualities is quantitative. This
means that "the progress from one quality [to another] is in an
uninterrupted continuity of the quality." (368)283 Yet, at some dramatic
moment, nature leaps from one quality to another, even if the
quantitative change is reassuringly gradual. Gradualness, however, is
the opposite of qualitative change. In gradualness, the quality of the
thing is indifferent to the quantitative change.
1.

Remark: Examples of Such Nodal Lines; the Maxim, 'Nature Does
not Make Leaps'

A nodal line is like a knotted string. Between the knots is
quantitative difference, to which quality is indifferent. Each knot
represents a qualitative change. "The system of natural numbers
already shows a nodal line of qualitative moments which emerge in a
merely external succession," Hegel writes. (368)28"' Each number in the
line bears a quantitative relation to the one before or after it. But these
numbers likewise have specific relations with specific numbers when
the question is power or root. (This specific relation of a number and,
say, its square root would be an Elective Affinity).
280 "Aber es tritt ein Punkt dieser Anderung des Quantitativen ein, auf welchem die Qualitat
geSndert wird, das Quantum sich als spezifizierend erweist, so daB das veranderte quantitative
Verhaltnis in ein MaB und damit in eine neue Qualitat, ein neues Etwas, umgeschlagen ist."
[1:380],
281 "Es ist also nicht aus dem Vorhergehenden, sondem unmittelbar aus sich hervorgetreten."
[1:380],
282 HERBERT MARCUSE, HEGEL'S ONTOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF HISTORICITY 66 (Seyla
Benhabib trans,, 1987),
283 "[D]er Fortgang von einer Qualitat in stetiger Kontinuitat der Quantitat ist," [1:380-81],
284 "Das natiirliche Zahlensystem zeigt schon eine solche Knotenlinie von qualitativen
Momenten, die sich in dem bloB auBerlichen Fortgang hervortun," [1:381],
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The musical scale is a nodal line. A note is indifferent to the one
before or after it, but, in harmony, the notes have specific relations with
other notes, analogous to the specific relations between roots and
powers. Thus, as one plays notes on the piano, each successive one
seems unrelated to the one before, when "there suddenly emerges a
return, a surprising accord, of which no hint was given by the quality of
what immediately preceded it." (369)^^^ The harmony constitutes a
sudden interruption of the succession of merely indifferent relations
which do not alter the preceding specific reality
[A] specific
relation breaks in per saltum." (369)^^^
Qualitative leaps occur in chemical combinations. Water is a clear
example of this. Water instantly freezes when it reaches 0° C. It "does
not gradually harden as if thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying
until it reach the consistency of ice." (370)^^^ "Every birth and death,
far from being a progressive gradualness, is an interruption of it and is
the leap from a quantitative to a qualitative alteration." (369-70)28^
This Remark ends with a blast at gradualness which is seemingly at
odds with the early chapters on Being but, on further reflection, is not.
It will be recalled that, in the Ought, Being ceases to be—a cessation
which is the in-itself of Being. That is, the Finite ought to cease to be.
This led efficiently to the True Infinite, which ceases to be what it was
and yet remains what it was.289 Now, with regard to gradualness, Hegel
complains it is based on the assumption that what comes to be is already
actually in existence, but not yet perceptible because of its smallness.
Under the rule of gradualness, "coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be lose all
meaning." (370)290 The complaint seems to be that Being-in-itself is
quantified in gradualist discourse, and quantification is, in Measure, the
externalist position. Rather than denying the True Infinite here, Hegel
is merely complaining that, in gradualism, the True Infinite undergoes
change externally, not immanently.
In the moral sphere, Hegel complains, this is harmful. Gradualness
is a threat to morality. Stealing starts off being wrong, but perhaps the

285 "[T]ut sich vielmehr auf einmal eine Ruckkehr, eine uberraschende Ubereinstimmung
hervor, die nicht durch das unmittelbar Vorhergehende qualitativ vorbereitet war." [1:382].
286 "[D]er Fortgang an bloB gleichgultigen Verhaltnissen, welche die vorhergehende
spezifische Realitat nicht andem,. . . bricht somit durch einen Sprung ein spezifisches Verhaltnis
ein." [1:382]. This material on harmony was added in the 1831 edition of the Science of Logic.
BURBIDGE, REAL PROCESS,
note 12, at 57.

287 "Das Wasser wird durch die Erkaltung nicht nach und nach hart, so daB es breiartig wurde
und allmahlich bis zur Konsistenz des Eises sich verhartete, sondem ist auf einmal hart." [1:383].
The rendering of "breiartig" (pasty or viscous) into "like porridge" reveals more of Miller's
poetic side more than it does Hegel's.
288 "Alle Geburt und Tod sind, statt eine fortgesetzte Allmahlichkeit zu sein, vielmehr ein
Abbrechen derselben und der Sprung aus quantitativer Veranderung in qualitative." [1:383].
289 See Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 541.
290 "Es wird damit das Entstehen und Vergehen Uberhaupt aufgehoben." [1:383].
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filching of bus fare is not a crime, and so on. "It is through a more and
less that the measure of frivolity or thoughtlessness is exceeded and
something quite different comes about, namely crime, and thus right
becomes wrong and virtue vice." (371)^^' The point here is that, since
gradualness represents the external position (not the immanent one),
gradual change in morality subjectivizes the process. The reality of the
situation—the radical change from the legal to the criminal—becomes
obscured in quantitative measures.
In the political sphere, Hegel suggests that nations too change
quantitatively in terms of population. At a certain point, a eonstitution
no longer suits the state. The state has undergone qualitative change
which "renders it liable to instability and disruption under the same
constitution which was its good fortune and its strength before its
expansion." (371)^^^
C.

The Measureless

In the Nodal Line, some relations to some Measures are exclusive
and qualitative. Some are quantitative and inessential To the extent it
is subject to quantitative manipulation, the underlying quality of the
measure is indifferent. Yet, quantitative change is potentially lethal.
"Magnitude is that side of determinate being through which it can be
caught up in a seemingly harmless entanglement which can destroy it.
(371)293

The Understanding seizes upon this harmlessness of quantitative
change and brings it front and center:

291 "Es ist ein Mehr und Weniger, wodurch das MaB des Leichtsinns iiberschritten wird, und
etwas ganz anderes, Verbrechen, hervortritt, wodurch Recht in Unrecht, Tugend in Easier
iibergeht." [1:384].

,

_c

292 "[Ujber welches hinausgetrieben er haltungslos in sich zerfallt unter derselben Verlassung,
welche bei nur anderem Umfange sein Gluck und Seine Stdrke ausmachte. [1.384].
293 "Die GrdBe ist die Beschaffenheit, an der ein Dasein mil dem Scheme von
Unverfanglichkeit ergriffen und wodurch es zerstort werden kann." [1:384].
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Figure 22(a)
The Abstract Measureless
"The abstract measureless is the quantum as such which lacks an
inner significance and is only an indifferent determinateness which does
not alter the measure." 01\r'
Here, in the realm of the
Understanding, the abstract measureless "raises itself into a qualitative
determinateness." (371)295 jhat quantitative change has no further bite
is what makes the Measure measureless. But the Abstract Measureless
"is equally a quality on its own account." (371)296 its quality is that it
has no quality, in the sense of that which changes as a result of
quantitative pressure.292
^
The Abstract Measureless is a Specifying Measure, even it the
Specified Measure is at first indifferent to it. "Thus there is posited the
alternation of specific existences with one another and of these equally

294 "Das abstrakte MaBlose ist das Quantum uberhaupt als in
besmnungslos und als n
leichgultige Bestimmtheit, dutch welche das MaB nicht verandert wird." [1:384- J.
295 "[H]ebt sich zur qualitativen Bestimmtheit auf." [1:385].
296 "fElbenso einefflr sichseiendeQualitat." [1:385].
^
•
297 John Burbidge's account is far different. He seems to view the
^
„
bsolutely discontinuous qualities, conceived as distinct neutral compo^ds.
'ROCESS, supra note 12, at 47. But this leaves out the whole notion of Substrate, which
^ery point of the Nodal Line. Professor Burbidge then writes:
Since there is no qualitative boundary the two [neutral compounds] share-at le^t
to the extent that thought can anticipate it—they are simply external to each other So
we are far removed from even a minimal account that would enable us to understand
the relation. From this perspective no explanation is possible. We cannot conceive
what is involved; it is immeasurable.
.
M „ as
W. (footnote omitted). Thus, for Burbidge, what is immeasurahle is
^ at 48
"The transformation of one quality into another is defined as immeasurable. .
™
oase There is nothing inconceivable about the Measureless. It represents the substohal
Substrate which is immune from qualitative change through quantitative manipulation. It does
not represent a property of qualitiative transformations.
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with relations remaining merely quantitative—and so on ad infinitum.'"
(371)298 Palpably this modulation describes the dialectical moment.

Figure 22(b)
Quality of the Abstract Measureless
Hegel gives this new step no name other than the qualitative aspect
of the Abstract Measureless. Once again, quality appears on the
rightward side of the page—^the side of nothingness.
In this alternation, [1] proclaims itself not qualitative. As such, [1]
is immune to change from quantitative pressure. And by announcing
what it is not, it shows what it is. [3] announces that it is not
quantitative. Both of them export what they are not to [2]. Now
Speculative Reason intervenes to name this activity. [2] is the
Measureless (in its concrete form). This version of the Measureless is
beyond Quality and Quantity. We are on the verge of bringing to a
close the entire saga of Being.
The name Hegel assigns to this speculative step is the Infinite For
Itself:

Figure 22(c)
Infinite For Itself
In and For Self. Hegel compares this new Infinite to the earlier
versions. The most primitive Infinite was the Qualitative (or Spurious)
Infinite. "The qualitative infinite, as simply a determinate being, was
the eruption of the infinite in the finite as an immediate transition and
vanishing of the latter in its beyond." (371-72)299 what the Spurious

298 "[S]o ist die Abwechslung von spezifischen Existenzen miteinander und derselben ebenso
mil bloB quantitativ bleibenden Verhaltnissen gesetzt,—so fort ins Unendliche." [1:385],
299 "Die qualitative Unendlichkeit, wie sie am Dasein ist, war das Hervorbrechen des
Unendlichen am Endlichen, als unmittelbarer Ubergang and Verschwinden des Diesseits in
seinem Jenseits." [1:385],
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Infinite in Quality lacked was continuity. In Figure 7(b), the Spurious
Infinite went out of existence and became Another Finite.^®® The True
Infinite, in contrast, continued on: it stayed what it was and became
something different.^oi
The Quantitative Infinite was more advanced. It had continuity. It
expelled itself from itself, as did the Spurious Infinite. But, as it was by
now a True Infinite, the Quantitative Infinite remained what it was
while becoming something else.^®^ The Spurious Infinite was really Ae
qualitative Finite, but it became the True Infinite. The Quantitative
Infinite was already "in its own self its beyond and points beyond
itself." (372)303 As a True Infinite, it was both inside and outside of
itself.
,
,
The Infinite For Itself, in contrast, "posits both the qualitative and
quantitative as sublating themselves in each other. (372)30"' In short,
the Infinite For Itself represents Measure returned to itself, and, in this
reflection-into-self, the Infinite For Itself shows itself to be dehors the
realm of Being.
. .
The Infinite For Itself is beyond the concept of qualitative change.
Qualitative change depended upon quantitative change, which was in
the realm of the extemal. So long as Measure is open to quantitative
and hence to qualitative change, it is slave to something extemal ^not
yet free. Yet the Abstract Measureless, as pure externality, sublated
itself. It converted itself into Quality, and then into "that which is
determined in and for itself." (372)305
Here is the concept of "in and for self." This concept will become
the very essence of the Doctrine of Essence on whose doorstep we now
tentatively hesitate. Being-in-itself was mere implicitness. The job of
the in-itself was to become for itself. Being-for-self as such expelled its
content and became Quantity. Quantity had to recapture its Quality in
order to have tme subsistence. But the spectre of qualitative change still
portended an inability to subsist.306 Only when Quality and Quantity
are both sublated can the thing have self-subsistence. The state that is
beyond quantitative and qualitative transition is being-in-and-for-self.
"This unity which thus continues itself into itself in its altemating
300
301
302
303
304

Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 535-36.
Mat 541.
Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2079-80.
"[Slein Jenseits an ihm selbst und weist Uber sich hinaus." [1:385].
^ . j"
"[S]etzt ebensowohl das Qualitative wie das Quantitative als sich ineinander aufhebend.

[1:385].
305 "[D]as an und fur sich Bestinuntsein." [1:385].
306 This moment of Measure is described by one commentator as follows: "[t]he precise nature
of 'measure' is shown to be that of superseded externality which constitutes totality in tot it
reinstates the sublated being-for-self.... [M]easure has still to be regarded as an externality, a
more or less, the determination of the concrete truth of finite being." Ferrmi, supra note 27, at
33-4.
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measures is the truly persisting self-subsistent material substance or
thing." (372)307
Positing. Hegel now makes three propositions about the Infinite
For Itself. The first is qualitative. The second is quantitative. The third
is the beyond of these concepts.
(a) There is now posited a "perennial substrate" that underlies all
qualitative change. (372)308 This is a "severance of being from its
determinateness." (372)309 This severance began in Qunatum. In
Quantity, generally, "a thing is indifferent to its affirmative
determinateness." (372)3io it cares not what content is attributed to it by
the will of the mathematician. This was the Qualitative Something of
the Quantum.3'1 in Measure, this Substrate is in unity with its Quantity
and Quality—as [4, 5, 6] in Figure 22(c) illustrates. Each of these
moments is the beyond of the other. Their middle term is the Substrate
which is the beyond of them both. The Substrate is thus a True Infinity.
It goes out of itself and gets externally measured. But in doing so, it
remains within itself and hence beyond all Measure [7].
(B) The Measures in which the Substrate manifests itself are
"qualitative self-subsistent measures." (372)
Nevertheless the
difference between the Substrate and these Measures is quantitative
only. That is, the Substrate is continuous with them.

(y) The Substrate negates both its qualitative and its quantitative
moments. Now the qualitative is quantitative in so far as the Substrate
is concerned. The Substrate [7] is the name for the constant modulation
between Quantity and Quality, "and the meaning of this process is only
to show or to posit the determinate being" of the Substrate. (373)3i2
"Consequently, the measures and the self-subsistent things posited with
them are reduced to states. The alteration is only change of a state, and
the subject of the transition is posited as remaining the same in the
process." (373)3i3
Let us pause to note a transition in the meaning of the crucial word
"positing." We saw that, in the realm of Quality, things "were posited"
by an external consciousness.By and large, concepts did not posit
themselves. Now, the Infinite For Itself manifests itself in its
307 "Diese so sich in ihrem Wechsel der MaBe in sich selbst kontinuierende Einheit ist die
wahrhaft bestehen bleibende, selbstandige Materie, Sache." [1:385].
308 "Grundlage in ... als perennierend." [1:385],
309 "[D]ies Abtrennen des Seins von seiner Bestimmtheit." [1:385].
310 "[G]roB ist etwas als gleichgultig gegen seine seiende Betsimmtheit." [1:385].
311 Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2075.
312 "[U]nd der Sinn dieses Prozesses ist nur das Dasein, das Zeigen oder Setzen, daB
demselben ein solches Subtrat zugrunde liegt." [1:386].
313 "Damit sind die MaBe und die damit gesetzten Selbstandigkeiten zu Zustanden
herabgesetzt. Die Veranderung ist nur Anderung eines Zustandes, und das Ubergehende ist als
darin dasselbe bleibend gesetzt." [1:386].
314 Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 483-84.
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Determinate Being, but remains beyond it. Here is positing as sueh. It
represents the concept armouncing what it is not. And by announcing
this, it announces what it is.
This appearance of true positing will generate a change in our
standard convention. In the realm of Being, the Understanding focused
on what is. The focus was always leftward—the side of being. In
Essence, the shift will be rightward. Now it is posited that Essence is
what is not. It is not what appears externally.
Summary. Hegel now summarizes the progress across Real
Measure. At first, in Specific Quantity, the extremes were not yet selfsufficient Measures. Only the middle term was a Measure. Then, in
Ratio of Measures, the extremes became overt Measures in themselves.
In Elective Affinity, Measure was revealed to be a series of
Measures. The thing was metonymic. The thing "shows itself to be an
immanent specifying unity of a, self-subsistent measure distinguished
from its specifications." (373)3'^ But it is still a slave to externality.
[I]t is not yet the free Notion which alone gives its differences an
immanent determination: it is as yet only a substrate, a material, and
for its differentiation into totalities, i.e., into difference embodying
the nature of the unchanged substrate, it is dependent solely on the
external, quantitative determination which shows itself at the same
time as a difference of quality. (373-74)^'®
What the Measureless must now do is escape this dependence on
extemality altogether.
III.

THE BECOMING OF ESSENCE

Your inside is out!
Your outside is inP^^

Logic has posited a substrate that is beyond Quality and Quantity,
but we are not yet ready to slam shut the book of Being. There is first
the very short third chapter of Measure which previews the nature of the
inquiry in the Doctrine of Essence. The point of this chapter is to show

315 "[Z]eigt sich zwar als immanente spezifizierende Einheit eines ftirsichseienden MaBes
unterschieden von seinen Spezifikationen." [1:387].
316 "[N]och nicht der freie Begriff, welcher allein seinen Unterschieden immanente
Bestimmung gibt, sondem das Prinzip ist zunachst nur Substrat, eine Materie, flir deren
Unterschiede, um als Totalitaten zu sein, d.i. die Natur des sich seibst gleichbleibenden Substrats
in sich zu haben, nur die auBerliche quantitative Bestimmung vorhanden ist, die sich als
Verschiedenheit der Qualitdt zugleich zeigt." [1:387].
317 xhe Beatles, Everybody's Got Something to Hide, 'Cept for Me and My Monkey, in THE

WHITE ALBUM (1969).
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that external Measure is now internal to the Substrate.^'^ For this
reason, "measure is always the measure of a thing . .. , of a persistent,
self-sufficient material."^
A.

Absolute Indifference

The Understanding makes the first move. It contemplates the
Infinite For Itself and proclaims its principle to be Absolute
Indifference;

Figure 23(a)
Absolute Indifference
Hegel begins the discussion of Absolute Indifference by
characterizing some aspects of Being and Pure Quantity. Being, Hegel
says, is "abstract equivalence ... in which there is supposed to be as yet
no determinateness of any kind." (375)^20
would appear to refer to
Pure Being, before otherness was invoked to establish Determinate
Being. "Abstract equivalence" therefore refers to self-identity, of which
Hegel was a huge critic. The self-identical being that "is" is
"indifferent" to otherness. But ironically, that same entity was "not
different"otherness.
In Quantity, the thing is indifferent in both senses of "indifferent

318 According to another summary of this chapter: "everything manifests itself extemally, it
being of its very essence to do so. Its indifference to this external self-manifestation is, therefore,
only opposed in a relative manner to its identity with it. The distinction of quantity and quality
constitutes a relative opposition which expresses an absolute identity." Fleischhacker, supra note
4, at 221.
319 HAAS, supra note 216, at 158.
320 "[A]bstrakte Gleichgultigkeit,—wofilr, da sie flir sich als Sein gedacht werden soil, der
Ausdruek Indifferenz gebraucht worden ist,—an der noch keine Art von Bestimmtheit sein soil."
[1:387-88].
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to" and "indifferent from." Thus, "pure quantity is indifferenee as open
to all determinations provided that these are extemal to it and that
quantity has no immanent connection with them." (375)^^'
Absolute Indifference, however, is of a different sort. It is "the
indifference which, through the negation of every determinateness of
being, i.e., of quality, quantity, and their at first immediate imity,
measure, is a process of self-mediation resulting in a simple unity."
(375)^22 xhat is, the substrate is now posited as immune from extemal
manipulation. Its extemal manifestations are merely its "state," which
Hegel defines as "something qualitative and extemal which has the
indifference for a substrate." (375)^^^
The state of the Substrate is qualitative, extemal, and "a vanishing
determinateness." (375)^24 Heretofore, Quality has been the intemal
integrity of the thing against quantitative manipulation. But now Quality
has been extemalized. An extemalized intemality is a contradiction.
"State" proclaims, therefore, that it is not the essence of Measure.
Outward determinateness is now posited as "an empty differentiation."
(375)^2^ The other—the inner life—is the tme thing. Nevertheless the
inner is nothing without this outer. Therefore, "each of the two sides is
posited as having to be itself in principle .. . this whole." (376)^2^
Absolute Indifference is to be taken as "concrete, a mediationwith-self through the negation of every determination of being."
"Concrete" implies a mediation between being and nothing.^^s
It is the opposite of "abstract," and abstraction implies no indwelling
Spirit. Now, the mediation between being and nothing, or between
Quality and Quantity, is entirely within the selfhood of the thing.
Extemalities no longer work any effect on the thing. The thing is
beginning to taste freedom.
Thus, "[a]s this mediation [the thing]
contains negation and relation, and what was called state is its
immanent, self-related differentiation." (375)^^^ "Contains" here must
be read in the double sense of having it within and preventing it from
escaping. Thus, the extemal is not tmly extemal but is the very

321 "[D]ie reine Quantitat ist die Indifferenz als aller Bestimmungen fahig, so aber, dafl diese
ihr auBerlich [sind] und sie aus sich keinen Zusammenhang mit denselben hat." [1:388],
322 "[D]ie durch die Negation aller Bestimmtheiten des Seins, der Qualitat und Quantitat und
deren zunachst unmittelbarer Einheit, des MaCes, sich mit sich zur einfachen Einheit vermittelt."
[1:388],
323 "[E]in qualitatives AuBerliches, das die Indifferenz zum Substrate hat," [1:388],
324 "Verschwindendes," [1:388],
325 "[E]in leeres Unterscheiden," [1:388],
326 "[j]ede der beiden Seiten gesetzt ist, selbst an sich dies Ganze sein zu sollen," [1:389],
327 "[D]as Konkrete, das in ihm selbst durch die Negation aller Bestimmungen des Seins mit
sich Vermittelte," [1:388],
328 Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at 457,
329 "Als diese Vermittlung enthalt sie die Negation und Verhaltnis, und was Zustand hieB, ist
ihr immanentes, sich auf sich beziehendes Unterscheiden," [1:388],
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manifestation of the Substrate. Because of this containment of external
Measure, the thing "ceases to be only a substrate and in its own self on\y
abstract." (375)^^''
B.

Indifference as Inverse Ratio of Its Factors

In Figure 22(c), the Infinite For Itself reduced measure relations to
a Measureless Substrate. There, each extreme denied that it was either
the qualitative or the quantitative. Speculative Reason made of this
negative activity "the indivisible self-subsistent measure [7]", which is
"w/?o//y present in its differentiations [4, 5, 6]." (376)33i
The Understanding then discerned Absolute Indifference in Figure
23(a), or [7] -¥ [1]. Now it is the turn of Dialectical Reason to remind
the Understanding of its history. It brings forth the ideal moment of
mediation between Quantity and Quality, which is posited as being
"within the indifference itself [2]. (375)"2 Accomplishment of this
task, Hegel says, establishes the Being-for-self of the Substrate—or
Essence.

Figure 23(b)
Inverse Ratio of Its Factors
Dialectical Reason at first identifies the now-internal ratio [2] as
the mediated truth of Absolute Indifference [1], and of course the very
identification of [2] implies its difference from [1], and its isolation as
[3]. If [2] is both sides of the suppressed Ratio of Measures, [3] at first
views the sides as quantitative only. [3] stands over against [2], which is
fixed measure represents the
a "fixed measure." (376)233
qualitative limit to the quantitative Measures in the ratio. Together, the
limit [3] and the ratio [2] are called the Inverse Ratio of Its Factors.
And, incidentally, the fact that [3] limits [2] ends up being the very flaw
in Absolute Indifference that prevents it from entering the heavenly
kingdom of Essence. "Limit" stands for slavery to externally imposed
difference.

330
331
332
333

"[A]ufhort, nur Substrat und an ihr selbst, nur abstrakt zu sein." [1:388],
"[DJas untrennbare Selbstandige, daa in seinen Unterschieden ganz vorhanden ist." [1:388].
"[A]n ihr selbst und sie damit als fursichseiend gesetzt ist." [1:388].
"[F]este Mafi." [1:389].

192

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1

Inverse Ratio is a term developed at the end of QuantityAn
example of Inverse Ratio was xy = 16. In this expression, an increase in
X led to a decrease in y. The variables x and y were quite open to
external manipulation by the mathematician. But there was a limit to
the mathematician's power over x and y. The mathematician could not
make either x or y into zero. This resistance was important in re
establishing Quality as integral to Quantum.^^^
An aspect of Inverse Ratio was that the exponent—16—stayed
fixed—through the will of the mathematician. Now, the fixed measure
has become Absolute Indifference to Measure and hence immunity from
the external will of any mathematician or measurer. Hegel describes the
difference between the primitive and more advanced Inverse Ratios as
follows: "here the whole is a real substrate and each of the two sides is
posited as having to be itself in principle [an sick] this whole." (376)^^^
In other words, since externality is now sublated, everything happens
internally within the Substrate. And, in addition, any given part is the
Substrate. Hence, [2] is just as much the Substrate as [3] is. Relations
are no longer relation between inside and outside. There are now only
internal relations.
In the interest of establishing the Inverse Ratio of the Factors as the
internal moment of the Substrate, Hegel presents the ratio as a ratio of
quantities. But we are not to think that the Substrate is therefore the
sum of these quanta. Quantity here stands for the indifference of [3] to
[2] and the perfect continuity of [3] with [2], "in such a manner that it
[3] would not be in its own self a quantum or opposed in any way,
either as a sum or even as an exponent, to other quanta." (376)3" in
other words. Quantity stands for the externality of the Ratio of
Measures [3], whose "abstract determinateness... falls into
indifference." (376)338
point is to establish the Ratio of Measures
as "posited in [the Substrate] as moments." (376)33^
In the original Inverse Ratio of Figure 17(b), x and y were
inversely proportional. As x shrank in size, y grew. Is the Inverse Ratio
of Its Factors likewise inversely proportional? Here Hegel wishes only
to say that the Measures have a negative relationship to each other.
Perhaps one way of restating Hegel's point is as follows: (1) a "thing" is
a negative unity of its Measures with the unity being on the side of
Essence and the Measures on the side of Being. (2) Since the totality of
334 Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2138-48.
335
at 2142-45.
336 "[D]a6 hier das Ganze ein reales Stibstrat, und jede der beiden Seiten gesetzt ist, selbst an
sich dies Ganze sein zu sollen." [1:389],
337 "[S]o, dafi sie nicht an ihr selbst Quantum ware und in irgendeiner Weise als Summe oder
auch Exponent andem ... gegeniibertrate." [1:389].
338 "[A]bstrakte Bestimmtheit, welche in die Indifferenz fallt." [1:389].
339 "[U]m als Momente an ihr gesetzt zu sein." [1:389].
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Measures implies a metonymic thing, any externally imposed
quantitative increase of one Measure implies the quantitative decrease
of some other Measure. Otherwise, the thing does not remain the thing
it was but becomes some "difflerent" thing. Yet, since we are holding
the Inverse Ratio of Its Factors constant (just as we held 16 constant in
the more primitive Inverse Ratio), the thing is not permitted to become a
different thing. In short. Being is "limited" by the measureless thing. It
is in a zero sum situation at this point. In this sense, then, the Inverse
ratio of Its Factors is inverse. Any growth in the Logic now occurs
beyond the realm of mere Being.
Hegel at first presents the Inverse Ratio of the Factors as a
quantitative ratio, but, as the sides of the ratio are Measures, they are
likewise qualities. Suppose one of these qualities puts itself forth as a
quality. Hegel suggests that the other side must surrender its quality
and be merely quantitative. Apparently the point is that two qualities
meet each other as "mere oppugnancies," in Shakespearean terms.^'*''
One must strike the other down. Thus, of the two qualities, Hegel says
that "one of [them] is sublated by the other." (376)341 But they are
unified in a ratio nevertheless. And, Hegel further says, "neither is
separable from the other." (376)342
This mysterious proposition will be illustrated by centripetal and
centrifugal force, in the Remark that follows. There, we will learn that
if, say, centripetal force is predominant, then the planet must fly into the
sun, because centripetal force has bested centrifugal force and has
sublated it as a quality. (The fact that this does not happen, Hegel says,
testifies to the wrongness of the theory.)
Yet, if centripetal
predominates, it must likewise sublate itself. Once the planet flies into
the sun, there can be no further centropetal force. Rather, centripetal
and centrifugal force are obviously engaged in a zero sum relationship.
Something internal to planetary movement—^not measurable by these
forces—keeps the planet from flying into or away from the sun.343
Externality by now is defeated, and everything is in everything

240 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 130, act 1, sc. 3.
341 "[D]eren eine durch die andere aufgehoben." [1:389].
342 "[V]on der andem untrennbar ist." [1:389].
343 There is a Twilight Zone episode on this. At first, the earth seems to be flying into the sun
(centripetal force). The rich doctor abandons his dying patients and flies to northern Canada to
preserve his life. The patients faint and are revived by the doctor. It appears the earth is now
flying away from the sun. Everyone is freezing and the doctor is flying to Florida, which is
rumored to be warmer. The lesson of the episode is that, when isolated, centripetal and
centrifugal force obliterate the entire earth. Some measureless thing must be preserving the earth
from destruction.
As a child, watching this episode in true horror, it rather bothered me that no explanation is
given why the earth hurtling toward the sun, should so perversely and all of a sudden, insist on
hurtling away from the sun. But this is precisely Hegel's critique of the theories of planetary
movement that depend on centripetal and centrifugal force.
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else. "[Tjherefore eaeh side of the relation, too, contains both sides
within itself and is distinguished from the other side only by a more of
the one quality and a less of the other, and vice versa." (316^^'^
Nevertheless, because of universal interpenetration, the Specifying
Measures "are thus at the same time posited as self-subsistent relatively
to each other."
This self-subsistence of the sides is a fault,
however, that cannot carry over into the Doctrine of Essence.
Hegel next emphasizes that the immediate reign of Specifying
Measures over their other is terminated. The Inverse Ratio of the
Factors is now mediated by Absolute Indifference, and the whole is now
the ultimate most advanced Determinate Being. This Determinate
Being, Hegel says, is a totality. It is both the outward appearance and
the inner Essence of the thing.
But the unity of the ratio is only an indifference. The Substrate is
not expressly the unity that holds together the extemal outward
appearances. Furthermore, the moments of the ratio "are not yet
explicitly self-determined, i.e. are not yet determined as sublating
themselves into a unity within themselves and through one another."
(377)346 So far, the indifference of the unity is also indifferent toward
itself. (This is progressive, but, as Hegel, will say in the next section,
we must also see posited an indifference toward indifference—a
negation of the negation.)
Hegel now makes three propositions about the Substrate—"[tjhis
self-subsistent measure as thus indivisible." (377)^"^^ These three points
are three defects that are, respectively, qualitative (but in-itself),
quantitative and contradictory in nature.^^s ((j) Because the Substrate is
only ^'implicitly the totality, it possesses the determinatenesses which
are sublated in it, only as groundlessly emerging in it." (377)^''^ That is
to say, the implicit being of the Substrate and the real being of the Ratio
of Measures are unconnected. The problem is that we do not have
before us "the self-repulsion of the indifference." (377)^50 j^is will be
identified by Speculative Reason in the next section. So far, "the
indifference is not posited as self-determining but as being determinate
and determined only externally." (377)^^' (J3) At this point, the Inverse
344 "[j]ede der Seiten des Verhaltnisses enthalt daher ebenso sie beide in sich und ist nur durch
ein Mehr der einen Qualitat und das Weniger der andem und umgekehrt underschieden." [1:389],
345 "[Sjind so gegeneinander zugleich als selbstandig gesetzt." [1:390].
346 "[]Si]och nicht als fursichseiend, d.i. noch nicht an ihnen selbst und durcheinander sich zur
Einheit aufhebend bestimmt sind." [1:390].
347 "Dies so ruitrennbare Selbstandige ist nun naher zu betrachten." [1:390].
348 These three remarks parallel the qualitative, quantitative and eontradictory observations
made at the end of Real Measure. See supra text accompanying notes 306-13.
349 "[A]n sich die TotalMt, bleibend die Bestimmtheiten, welche in ihr aufgehoben sind, nur
grundlos an ihr hervortretend." [1:390].
350 "[A]ls das AbstoBen ihrer von sich selbst." [1:390].
331 "[S]ie nicht als selbstbestimmend, nur als auBerlich bestimmtseiend und
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Ratio of Its Factors is "in an inverted quantitative relation." (377)^^2
The Measures are involved in "a to and fro in the scale of magnitude."
(377)35^ It is not, however, Absolute Indifference that generates this
modulation. The external measurer is at work in generating this
activity. That is to say, given the substrate and given the stableness of
the state or outward measure of the substrate, and further given a change
in one of the infinite outward measures of the substrate, the substrate
stays what it is only if, externally, some other measure is adjusted to
prevent qualitative change in the substrate.
"The principle of
determination resides not in the indifference, but in something lying
outside it." (378)^^"^ Or, in other words, the alteration is "for us" and
therefore the result of mere external reflection.^^^ This is not good
enough, (y) The sides of the Inverse Ratio of Its Factors, as well as the
Absolute Indifference that unifies them, are each subsistent. Because
each side is indifferent to the other side, "their determinate being is
fi-eed from the transition of the qualitative sphere." (378)^5® In short,
each side is immune from external control. Because this is so, and
because each side also perfectly continues itself in the other side, we
have a contradiction. How can each side be simultaneously continuous
with (Quantity) and immune from (Quality) the other side?
The Substrate, Hegel says, is dependent on the continuity of
Quality into each side of the Inverse Ratio of Its Factors. "If the two
qualities are self-subsistent—^taken, say, as if they were sensuous things
independent of each other—then the whole determinateness of
indifference falls asunder." (378)^5'^ Interpenetration must be complete,
and, for this reason, the qualitative nature of each factor is precisely its
quantitative continuity. If the qualities were only quanta, they would be
external and "would reach beyond the other and would have in its more
an indifferent determinate being which the other would not have." (37879)358 But such externality has been sublated. "From this," Hegel says,
"it follows that [the factors] are in equilibrium-, that by as much as the
one increases or decreases, the other likewise would increase or

bestimmtwerdend." [1:390].
352 "[i]n umgekehrtem quantitativem Verhdltnisse." [1:390].
353 "[E]in Hin- und Hergehen an der Grdfle." [1:390].
354 "Es wird auf ein Anderes hingewiesen, das auflerhalb ihrer ist und in welchem das
Bestimmen liegt." [1:390].
355 On the concept of "for us" and external reflection, see Carlson, Quality, supra note 9, at
434-45.
356 "[i]hr Dasein ist durch diese Gleichgilltigkeit dem Ubergehen des Qualitativen
entnommen." [1:391].
357 "Sind beide Qualitdten selbstdndig,—etwa genommen wie voneinander imabhSngige,
sinnliche Materien,—so fallt die ganze Bestimmtheit der Indifferenz auseinander." [1:391]. This
fault is laid at Spinoza's doorstep in the Remark that follows.
358 "[G]inge die eine tlber die andere hinaus und hatte in ihrem Mehr ein gleichgUltiges
Dasein, welches die andere nicht hatte." [1:391].
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decrease and in the same proportion." (379)359 xhese last two remarks
relate to the zero sum quality of Being at this stage. There can be no
quantitative surplus because this would also be a qualitative (or selfidentical) surplus. Yet, the qualitative surplus cannot exist separate and
apart from its quantitative relation to other qualities.^^o
There can be no question of quantitative surplus. "The more by
which one of the eorrelated moments would exceed the other would
only be a baseless determination." (379)3^' In other words, since the
"thing" is metonymic, a quantitative surplus of any given measure is
inconsistent with the truth of the thing and therefore impossible and
meaningless. Being is logically in a zero sum situation at this point and
therefore limited in the face of the "fixed measure."
In the penultimate paragraph of this section, Hegel tries for a very
subtle point. The Determinate Being of the factors (in their zero-sum
mode) requires a distinct difference between Quality and Quantity. The
complete interpenetration suggests that the Determinate Being of the
factors vanishes. This point presupposes his Remark on centripetal and
centrifugal force. This point will therefore be deferred until a
description of Hegel's critique of these countervailing forces is
provided.
Meanwhile, Hegel concludes by saying that the dialectic unity in
Figure 23(b) is "a contradiction in every respect." (379)3^2 Figure 23(b)
"therefore has to be posited as sublating this its contradictory nature and
acquiring the character of a self-determined, self-subsistent being which
has for its result and truth not the unity which is merely indifferent, but
that immanently negative and absolute unity which is called essence."
(379)363

1.

Remark: Centripetal and Centrifugal Force

Hegel pauses to comment on centripetal and centrifugal force in
planetary orbits. The point, as usual, is that science has insufficiently
distinguished between qualities and quantities.
The last section described the "relationship of a whole which is
359 "Hieraus folgt dies, dafi sie im Gleichgewicht sind, daB um soviel die eine sich vermehrte
Oder verminderte, die andere gleichfalls zu- oder abn^hme und in demselben Verhaitnisse zuoder abnahme." [1:391-92].
360 It will be recalled that Quality as isolated ceased to be. See Carlson, Quality, supra note 9,
at 531-34.
361 "Das Mehr, um welches das eine der in Beziehung stehenden Momente tlber das andere
hinaus ware, wSre nur eine haltunglose Bestimmimg." [1:392].
362 "[D]er allseitige Widerspruch." [1:392].
363 "[S]ie ist somit so zu setzen, als dieser sich selbst aufhebende Widerspruch ziff
fursichseienden Selbstandigkeit bestimmt zu sein, welche die nicht mehr nur indifferente, sondem
die in ihr selbst immanent negative absolute Einheit zum Resultate und Wahrheit hat, welche das
Wesen ist." [1:392].
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supposed to have its determinateness in the quantitative difference of
two factors determined qualitatively against each other." (379)364
relation is supposedly exhibited by the elliptical movement of the
planets. Centripetal force is what draws the planets toward the center.
Centrifugal force drives the planets away from the center. Their
equilibrium is the elliptical orbit of the planet.
These forces, Hegel implies, are not an example of Inverse Ratio of
the Factors. Such a ratio is constituted by Specifying Measures which
are complete unto themselves, indifferent to each other, yet diffused
with Substrate. Instead, Hegel says, centripetal and centrifugal force are
"only two qualities in inverse relation to each other." (379)365
The inverse relation of centripetal and centrifugal force is
supported by empirical fact, but, Hegel claims, the theory of centripetal
and centrifugal force destroys the basic facts of astronomy. "[0]r if, as
is proper," Hegel writes, "the fact is retained it escapes notice that the
theory proves to be meaningless in face of the fact." (379-80)366
Hegel refers to a well-known astronomic fact that planets in an
elliptical orbit sweep equal areas with every increment of time.367
Because the orbit is elliptical, this fact implies that "velocity is
accelerated as they approach perihelion and retarded as they approach
aphelion." (380)36^ Of this faet, Hegel writes: "[t]he quantitative
side.. . has been accurately ascertained by the untiring diligence of
observation, and further, it has been redueed to its simple law and
formula. Henee, all that can properly be required of a theory has been
accomplished." (380)369
But for Hegel this is not enough. Theory assumes centripetal and
centrifugal force are qualitative, opposed moments. Quantitatively,
however, one increases and the other decreases, as the planets, in their
evil mixture, pursue their orbits. At some point, the forces reverse
themselves in their dominance, until the next tipping point is reached.
"[Tjhis way of representing the matter," Hegel writes, "is
contradicted by the essentially qualitative relation between their

364 "Das Verhaltnis eines Ganzen, das seine Bestimmtheit in dem GroBenunterschiede
qualitativ gegeneinander bestimmter Faktoren haben soil." [1:392].
365 "[N]ur zwei Qualitaten im umgekehrten Verhaltnisse zueinander." [1:392].
366 "[A]uf welche die in dieselbe gebrachte Theorie fiihrt, namlich das zugmnde liegende
Faktum zu zerstdren oder, indem dieses, wie gehdrig, festgehalten wird, die Leerheit der Theorie
gegen dasselbe darzutun." [1:392-93].
367 James W. Garrison, Metaphysics and Scientific Proof: Newton and Hegel, in HEGEL AND
NEWTONIANISM, supra note 4, at 3, 8.
368 "Geschwindigkeit beschleimigt, indem sie sich dem Perihelium, und sich vermindert,
indem sie sich dem Aphelium nahem." [1:393]. Perihelion is the closest distance from the sim.
Aphelion is the farthest.
369 "Das Quantitative ... ist durch den imermtidliehen FleiB desBeobachtens genau bestimmt
und dasselbe welter auf sein einfaches Gesetz und Formel zuruck gefiihrt, somit alles geleistet,
was wahrhaft an die Theorie zu fordem ist." [1:393].
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respective determinatenesses which makes their separation from each
other completely out of the question." (380)^^® Each of the forces only
has meaning in relation to the other. Neither can exist on its own.^^' To
say, then, that one of the forces preponderates over its fellow is to say
that the preponderant force is out of relation with its fellow to the extent
of the surplus. But this is to say that the surplus does not exist."2
Hegel drives this point home;
It requires but little consideration to see that if, for example, as is
alleged, the body's centripetal force increases as it approaches
perihelion, while the centrifugal force is supposed to decrease
proportionately, the [centrifugal force] would no longer be able to
tear the body away from the former and to set it again at a distance
from its central body; on the contrary, for once the former has gained
the preponderance, the other is overpowered and the body is carried
towards its central body with accelerated velocity. (380-81)"3

Only an alien force could save centrifugal force from being
overwhelmed. And this is tantamount to saying that the force that
guides the planets sans check cannot be explained.
The transformation from weakness to strength of one or the other
forces implies that "each side of the inverse relation is in its own self
the whole inverse relation." (381)^24
predominant force implies its
opposite, servient force. The servient force has not vanished. All that
recurs then on either side is the defect characteristic of this inverse
relation." (381)"5 Either each force is wrongly attributed a selfidentical existence free and clear of the other, "the pair being merely
externally associated in a motion (as in the parallelogram of forces).
(381)"6 Or neither side can achieve "an indifferent, independent
370 "Dieser Vorstellung widerspricht aber das Verhaltnis ihrer wesentlich qualitativen
Bestimmtheiten gegeneinander. Durch diese sind sie schlechthin nicht auseinanderzubringen.
[1:393].
.
^
,
371 This recalls Hegel's critique of calculus, where y or x were qualitative and meaningless
outside the ratio y/x. See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 4, at 2082-138.
372 This point is related to Hegel's general point that force can only be observed if opposed by
another force. See generally Carlson, supra note 228.
373 "Es ist eine sehr einfache Betrachtung, daB, wenn z. B. wie vorgegeben wird, die
Zentripetalkrafl des Kdrpers, indem er sich dem Perihelium nShert, zunehrnen, die
Zentrifiigalkraft hingegen um ebensoviel abnehmen soil, die letztere nicht mehr vermdchte, ihn
der erstem zu entreiflen und von seinem Zentralkdrper wieder zu entfemen; im Gegenteil, da die
erstere einmal das Ubergewicht haben soil, so ist die andere ilberwaltigt, und der Korper wird nut
beschleunigter Geschwindigkeit seinem Zentralkdrper zugefuhrt. [1.394].
374 "[D]aB jede der Seiten des umgekehrten Verhaltnisses an ihr selbst dies ganze umgekehrte
Verhaltnis ist." [1:394].
375 "Es rekurriert damit nur an jeder Seite das, was der Mangel an diesem umgekehrten
Verhaltnis ist." [1:395].
. .
376 "[U]nd mit dem bloB auBerlichen Zusammentreffen derselben zu einer Bewegung, wie im
Parallelogramm der Krafle." [1:395]. The parallelogram of forces describes the phenomenon that
if two forces exist as vectors, their average vector forms a parallelogram with the original vectors,
provided one of the original vectors is multiplied by the imaginary number, -1.
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subsistence in the face of the other, a subsistence supposedly imparted
to it by a more." (382)^'^
The idea of intensity cannot help.
"[TJhis too has its
determinateness in quantum and consequently can express only as much
force (which is the measure of its existence) as is opposed to it by the
opposite force." (382)3''^ In other words, intensity is just a way of
smuggling in the idea of the quantitative surplus, which is precisely not
allowed because the Measures are in a zero siun relation at this point.
In any case, the sudden shift from predominant to servient implies
qualitative change. The increase in one implies the decrease of the
other.
The biological sciences had a like dilemma in the opposed forces
of sensibility and irritability,^^^ but, Hegel writes: "the confused
hotchpotch of nonsense in which it became entangled through the
uncritical use of these determinations of the Notion soon led to the
abandonment in these spheres of this formalism which, however, is
practiced without restraint... in physical astronomy." (382)^^^
Vanishing. Just prior to this Remark, Hegel makes an argument
that can now be more conveniently apprehended. Hegel has said in the
Remark that, if centripetal force were predominant, nothing can explain
why this force would not sublate centrifugal force once and for all,
causing the planet to fly moth-like into the sun. Hegel indicates in the
penultimate paragraph of the prior section that, in Maeasure generally,
this sublation must logically occur. Furthermore, since the qualities in
the Inverse Ratio of the Factors cannot exist separate and apart from
their quantitative relation to each other, the necessary sublation of
Quality implies the sublation of Quantity. These being sublated,
Measure implies the realm of Essence. "Each of these hypothetical
factors vanishes, whether it is supposed to be beyond or equal to the
other." (379)^^' Since Quality and Quantity there must be, the mere
isolation of these, even in a perfect equilibrium, implies their sublation
in general.
This self-abolition of Quality and Quantity, Hegel
comments paradoxically, "constitutes itself [as] the sole self-subsistent
quality." (379)^^2 xhis argument, if valid, establishes [2, 3] in Figure
377 "[K]eine ein gleichgUltiges, selbstandiges Bestehen gegen die andere erhalten kann, was ihr
durch ein Mehr zugeteilt werden soilte." [1:395],
378 "[D]a es selbst in dem Quantum seine Bestimmtheit hat und damit ebenso nur so viel Kraft
aufiem kann, d. h. nur insoweit existiert, als es an der entgegengesetzten Kraft sich
gegenuberstehen hat." [1:395],
379 These refer to an organic thing's attraction to and repulsion from another thing,
380
dem unkritischen Gebrauche dieser Begriffsbestimmungen verwickelte, hat hier zur
Folge gehabt, dafi dieser Formalismus bald wieder aufgegeben worden ist, der . . , besonders der
physikalischen Astronomie in seiner ganzen Ausdehnung fortgefuhrt wird," [1:396],
381 "Jeder dieser sein sollenden Faktoren verschwindet ebenso, indem er fiber den andem
hinaus, als indem er ihm gleich sein soil," [1:392],
382 "[D]ieser also sich zum einzigen Selbstandigen macht," [1:392],
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23(b) as an "inherent incompatibility with itself, a repelling of itself
from itself." (384)383 xhis self-repulsion is the step that Speculative
Reason identifies.
But is the argument valid? My conclusion is yes. At the point
where the argument is hazarded, the thing was metonymic. It was a
negative unity of all the Measure relations that the thing has with all the
other things in the world. The thing, being fixed, does not permit
quantitative disequilibrium of the Measures. The mere attempt of any
such surplus to manifest itself is self-destructive.
Any such
manifestation puts the surplus—a qualitative proposition in a lethal
isolation from
the thing.
This self-identity is thus radically
incommensurate with any other thing, including itself. Such an entity
destroys itself by its very logic. What is left is the beyond of the realm
of Being—Essence.
Spinoza. Hegel concludes his Remark by returning to Spinozan
substance. Absolute Indifference is its "fundamental determination,"
Hegel says. (382)38^ Every determination is posited as vanished before
substance. Difference is introduced empirically, and the source of
difference is the intellect.385 Being external, Spinozan difference is, in
Hegelian terms, quantitative. "[T]he difference is not immanent in the
indifference, for as quantitative it is rather the opposite of immanence."
(383)386 Contrary to Spinoza, difference must be grasped qualitatively.
Spinozan Substance, Hegel says, echoing a theme from the Subjective
Logic, is not yet subject.387 in Spinoza's philosophy, "quantitative or
qualitative determination falls apart... it is the dissolution of measure,
in which both moments [should be] directly posited as one." (383)388

C.

Transition into Essence

The final move in the Doctrine of Being is the move to Essence.

383 "[D]ie Unvertraglichkeit ihrer mit sich selbst, AbstoBen ihrer von sich selbst." [1:397].
384 "[D]ie Grundbestimmung." [1:396].
385 For Spinoza, as interpreted by Hegel, intellect is "modal"—i.e., external to substance. See
5i/pra text accompanying note 46.
» i
386 "[D]er Unterschied ist nicht ihr immanent, als quantitativer ist er vielmehr das Gegenteil
der Immanenz." [1:396].
,
>
c
387 xhat substance is subjeet is a key Hegelian slogan from the Phenomenology. See
PHENOMENOLOGY, IWPRA note 34, at 10.
• • J- A FI 388 "[Q]uantitativer oder qualitativer Bestimmung auseinanderfSllt... sie ist die Autlosung
des MaBes, in welchem beide Momente unmittelbar als eins gesetzt waren." [1:396-97].
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Figure 23(c)
Essence
"Absolute Indifference," Hegel says, "is the final determination of
being before it becomes essence." (383)3^^ This must be read in the
technical sense.
The Understanding determines propositions.
Dialectical Reason negates them by pointing out a contradiction
between the determination and its history. Speculative Reason shows
the unity between the two. Absolute Indifference is the final move of
the Understanding—the final attempt by the Understanding to state
what is. In our conventional mode of depicting the official moves in the
Science of Logic, the Understanding shifted the middle term over to the
left side of the page. This is the last such move. In the Doctrine of
Essence the Understanding shifts the middle term over to the right, to
explain what is not.
Why is Absolute Indifference not yet Essence? Because "it still
contains difference as an external, quantitative determination; this is its
determinate being." (383)3^" Absolute Indifference is "only implicitly
the absolute, not the absolute grasped as actuality." (383)39i Actuality,
Hegel says, requires that the differences be posited as indifferent. The
further step that is needed "is to grasp that the reflection of the
differences into their unity is not merely the product of the external
reflection of the subjective thinker, but that it is the very nature of the
differences of this unity to sublate themselves." (384)^^2
As will be shown in some future installment, actuality is precisely
the self-sublation of appearances. Essence is actual—it manifests
itself—when it fades away.
Hegel identifies the unity (or Essence) of the existential differences
as "absolute negativity." (384)^^^ This negativity is a truly radical
389 "Die absolute Indifferenz ist die letzte Bestimmung des Seins, ehe dieses zum Wesen
wird." [1:397].
390 "[D]en Unterschied als auBerlichen, quantitativen an ihr hat. Dies ist ihr Dasein." [1:397].
391 "[N]ur das ansichseiende bestimmt, nicht als das fursichseiende Absolute gedacht zu sein."
[1:397].
392 "Was hier noch fehlt, besteht darin, daU diese Reflexion nicht die auBere Reflexion des
denkenden, subjektiven BewuBtseins, sOndem die eigene Bestimmung der Unterschiedejener
Einheit sei, sich aufzuheben." [1:3970].
393 "[A]bsolute Negativitat." [1:397].
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indifference. It is an indifference to Being, which is therefore an
indifference to itself, and even an indifference "to its own indifference."
(384)3^'' What we have is a truly indeterminate indifference, in the
nature of Pure Quantity. Indeed, at the beginning of Essence, Hegel
will confirm that, "[i]n the whole of logic, essence occupies the same
place as quantity does in the sphere of being; absolute indifference to
limit." (391)^^^ Essence is therefore a retum to Quantity, but in an
enriched form.
The determination of Absolute Indifference was "from every
aspect a contradiction." (384)3^^ First, it is "in itself ihe totality in
which every determination of being is sublated and contained." (384)^''^
Yet, it asserts the Inverse Ratio of the Factors as an externality.
As thus the contradiction of itself and its determinedness,... it is the
negative totality whose determinatenesses have sublated themselves
in themselves and in so doing have sublated this fundamental onesidedness of theirs .... The result is that indifference is now posited
as what it in fact is, namely a simple and infinite, negative relationto-self. (384)398
That Essence is simple is portrayed in [7]. That it is infinite is to
say that Essence goes outside of itself but remains what it is (though,
now that extemality has been abolished, "outside" must be understood
as really inside).399 That Essence is negative will be consistently shown

394 "[GJegen ihre eigene Gleichgultigkeit." [1:397].
395 "Das Wesen ist im Ganzen das, was die Quantitdt in der Sphare des Seins war; die absolute
Gleichgilltigkeit gegen die Grenze." [11:5].
396 "[N]ach alien Seiten als der Widerspruch gezeigt." [1:397].
397 "Sie ist an sich die Totalitat, in der alle Bestimmungen des Seins aufgehoben imd enthalten
sind." [1:397].
398 "So der Widerspruch ihrer selbst und ihres Bestimmtseins, ihrer an sich sienden
Bestimmung und ihrer gesetzten Bestimmtheit, ist sie die negative Totalitat, deren
Bestimmtheiten sich an ihnen selbst tmd damit diese ihre Gnmdeinseitigkeit... aufgehoben
haben. Gesetzt hiemit als das, was die Indifferenz in der Tat ist, ist sie einfache und unendliche
negative Beziehimg auf sich." [1:397].
399 Hegel says in the Lesser Logic.
In the sphere of Essence one category does not pass into another, but refers to another
merely. In Being, the form of reference is purely due to our reflection on what takes
place: but it is the special and proper characteristic of Essence. In the sphere of Being,
when some[thing] becomes another, the some[thing] has vanished. Not so in Essence:
here there is no real other, but only diversity, reference of the one to its other. The
transition of Essence is therefore at the same time no transition: for in the passage of
different into different, the different does not vanish: the different terms remain in their
relation. When we speak of Being and Nought, Being is independent, so is Nought.
The case is otherwise with the Positive and the Negative. No doubt these possess the
characteristic of Being and Nought. But the positive by itself has no sense; it is wholly
in reference to the negative .... In the sphere of Being the reference of one term to
another is only implicit; in Essence... it is explicit. And this in general is the
distinction between the forms of Being and Essence: in Being everything is immediate,
in Essence everything is relative.
LESSER LOGIC, supra note 6, § 111 Remark.
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by the Understanding, which from now on says only what things are
not. That it is a relation and a relation to self is apparent in [4, 5, 6, 7]
of Figure 23(c).
What is the fate of expelled Being? These dejecta "do not emerge
as self-subsistent or external determinations." (3 84)^00 They are borne
by and retained as ideal moments of the essential thing. Furthermore,
these materials "are only through their repulsion from themselves."
(384)'*®' In other words, appearances are authentic to the Essence of the
thing. But they are not what they are affirmatively. This is the now
superseded error of the Understanding. Rather, these beings are "sheer
positedness." (384)'*®^
A positedness, in Essence, will be what
determinateness was in the realm of Being. It is a relation between the
affirmative and the negative, with the understanding that affirmations
are really negations of the negation invoked by Essence.
Being has now abolished itself. It has, to paraphrase Romeo, cut
off its own head with a golden axe and exiled itself to a negative
beyond.
And in this self-banishment, Hegel states that the
presupposition, with which the entire Logic began, has sublated itself.
Being turns out to be "only a moment of [Essence's] repelling." (385)'*®^
The self-identity for which Being strived so assiduously "is only as the
resulting coming together with itself." (385)'*®'* Being is now Essence,
"a simple being-with-self." (385)'*®^
CONCLUSION

Hegel's theory of measure differs starkly from that which emanates
from analytic philosophy, in that Hegel identifies Quality as a
constituent part of Measure. According to one recent example,
provided by Henry Kyburg: "[m]ost scientific theories—if one is
willing to translate predicates into characteristic functions [i.e.,
universal truths] one could say all scientific theories—express relations
among quantities. To test a theory or to apply it therefore requires
measurement.'"*®®
Kyburg's account reveals a sensitivity to the fact that empirical
judgments might contradict mathematical maxims, yet the justification
of these maxims is dogmatically asserted. There is, however, no
400 "Die Bestimmungen als solche abgestoBene gehoren aber nun nicht sich selbst an, treten
nicht in Selbstandigkeit oder AuBerlichkeit hervor." [1:398].
401 "[N]ur durch deren AbstoBen von sich sind." [1:398].
402 "Gesetzte, schlechthin." [1:398],
403 "[N]ur ein Moment ihres AbstoBens ist." [1:398].
404 "[N]ur ist als das resultierende, unendliche Zusammengehen mit sich." [1:398],
405 "[E]infaches Sein mit sich." [1:398].
406

HENRY E. KYBURG, THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 9 (1984).

204

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1

definitional work on what quantity or quality
Kyburg concerns
himself with a theory of error to describe the gap between observation
and axiomatic truth. But to put the problem in this way is to reinscribe
the dogma of axiomatic truth as the ultimate criterion after all.
For Hegel, the gap between judgment and background truth is
constitutional. In the background is the very gap that analytic
philosophy would subjectivize by attributing it to the observer. For
Hegel, measurements cannot possibly be accurate, because any "thing"
is, at its core, Measureless. There can be no question of correcting,
once and for all, the errors of measurement.

407 Kyburg seems to equate "quantity" with Hegelian Measure. Thus there are "kinds of
quantities." M at 19. In general, the concept of "quantity" is treated as self-evident. Quantity at
times seems to be nothing other than language stripped of its coimotative penumbra. Id. at 20 ("//
it were the case that we could speak without a background fund of information and convention
concerning the application of language, then it would be possible for us to develop notions of
quantity analogous to those with which we actually operate.").
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains the first 69 steps in the Science of Logic. These steps are grouped
in triads. The first triad—^bearing the label (a)—represents the simple, immediate proposition of
the Understanding. The Understanding states what is. The left side of the drawing represents
being and the right side of the page represents nothingness. Because Measure is overtly the unity
of Quality and Quantity, the Understanding begins to see dialectically when Measure is finally
reached. Nevertheless, it has an immediate view of this mediation.
The second member of a triad—bearing the label (b)—is the dialectical step. It opposes
what is not to what is. The portion of the circle marked [2] is contrasted with [1]—the
Understanding's immediate proposition. Although [2] is always internal to [1, 2], Dialectical
Reason generates [3]—itself an isolated, immediate, and hence defective claim.
The final member of the triad—^bearing the label (c)—is the speculative step in which
being and nothing are thought together. Within the speculative sphere [4-7], [7] represents a
static immediate account of a dynamic process [4-6].
After the speculative step, the Understanding makes a one-sided proposition about the prior
step. This is shown as the Understanding's dragging the prior figure over to the left side of the
page—the side of affirmative being.
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Figure 1 (a)

Figure 1 (b)

Figure 1 (c)

Pure Being

Pure Nothing

Becoming

Figure 3 (a)

Figure 3 (b)

Figure 3 (c)

Something/Other

Being-for-Other and Being-in-ltseif

Determination of the In-ltseif
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Figure 11 (a)

Figure 11 (b)

Figure 11 (c)

Continuity

Discreteness

Enriched Quantity

Figure 12 (a)

Figure 1 2 (b)

Figure 1 2 (c)

Continuous Magnitude

Discrete Magnitude

Quantum
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Figure 14 (a)
Extensive Magnitude

Figure 1 4 (b)
Intensive Magnitude (Degree)
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Figure 1 4 (c)
The Quality of Quantum

(Extensive Quantum)

Figure 1 5 (a)
Intensive Magnitude (Degree)

Figure 1 5 (b)

Figure 15 (c)

Extensive Magnitude

Qualitative Something
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Figure 16 (a)

Figure 16 (b)

Figure 16 (c)

Quantitative Something

Quantitative Infinite Progress

Infiniteiy Great and Infinitely Smail

Figure 18 (a)

Figure 18 (b)

Immediate Measure

Mediated Immediate Measure

Figure 18 (c)
Specifying Meosure
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Figure 20 (a)
Combination of Measures

Figure 21 (a)
Continuity of Affinity

Figure 20 (b)
Measure as a

Figure 21 (b)
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Figure 20 (c)
Elective Affinity

!21 (C)

Nodal Line
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